Virtues and values as behaviour determinants

Abstract

The article deals with the problem of the relationship between moral values and virtues. It should be noted that the concept of moral values is confronted with difficulties of trying to solve the problem of why moral values would be used in an absolute sense: why we ought to behave well and not to behave badly. Ludwig Wittgenstein was the first to raise and formulate this problem in his Lecture on Ethics. Nobody, however, has put forward any adequate solution thus far. In our opinion, even the most mature solution proposed by Hare, which discerns the prescriptive and descriptive aspects in the concept of good, is unsatisfactory. We consider that the solution could be found on the basis of the classical theory of virtues. It should be noted that the concept of good when it is associated with the values is actually used in the analogical sense. The primal meaning of good is associated with a person, and only in an analogous way it is used in the notion of value. Therefore, in order to understand the determination of a human moral action it is necessary, in the analysis of conduct, to turn to the classical theory of virtues. This analysis helps us to understand the obligation of human behaviour. Without relation to an individual it is impossible to justify the obligation of a moral value. Hence, moral values have to be investigated only in relation with the virtues. On the other hand, the analysis of value allows us to understand virtues more thoroughly.