Why H. G. Gadamer’s “Philosophical Hermeneutics” Cannot Belong to the “Metaphysics of Presence”?

Abstract

H. G. Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” elicited a controversial response in contemporary philosophy. R. Rorty and G. Vattimo tried to impart a more relativistic shade to H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In contrast, J. Derrida was inclined to consider H. G. Gadamer hermeneutics more dependent on the previous epoch of “metaphysics of presence”. This article purposes to reveal the points of contact and division between the thinking strategies employed by hermeneutics and deconstruction, providing theoretical arguments why H. G. Gadamer hermeneutics should not be reduced to the so-called “metaphysics of presence”. The question whether H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics belongs to “metaphysics of presence” or not is closely intertwined with the problem of dogmatism of meaning and relativism of meaning. J. Derrida was inclined to regard H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutic as a theory of a search for and discovery of a pre-existing or objective meaning which accounts for the theory’s persistent belonging with metaphysical dogmatism. In opposition to such judgement, this article seeks to substantiate the following thesis: in H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics which is based on the “good will” to understand, the problem of dogmatism of meaning (there is one universal objective meaning or truth) and relativism of meaning (there is a multitude of meanings open to interpretation without reference to the primary signified) can be solved by taking into consideration the way offered by E. Husserl phenomenology, i.e. by understanding any possible “thing” (die Sache) as a “thing-in-itself” only in different perceptual perspectives (die perspektivischen Abschattungen).