

# Creative technologies entrapped by instrumental mind

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The paper poses a question why creative processes are more and more often related to technologies and that is clearly visible in institutionalized scientific, cultural and political discourses. It is noteworthy that technologies, creative technologies including, are becoming instrumental mind-based methods, which aim to perform everything more efficiently, more economically and more advantageously. This way creative activity loses its essence and becomes a commodity easily defined in economic categories, and thus it is employed as an effective means used to control, influence and even manipulate the human consciousness. It is likely that modern technologies push everything that is essential to human life to periphery, everything that joins people for shared activities and has intrinsic values. The paper attempts to show that even the so-called “scientific axiology” based on formal social technologies is unable to deal with axiological problems of creative human essence if personal or subject-related intrinsic values are not taken into account. This way it is most likely to happen that such evaluation which emphasizes individual and unique emotional and spiritual human reality tends to be downplayed. This fact corroborates intuitive understanding that technologies employed in *creative activities* should serve only as a supplementary tool but not become a self-contained tool which overshadows transcendental human creative powers.

It points to the conclusion that though the usage of technical terms in contemporary science and art (culture, in general) is hardly avoidable, it should be attempted to return to the initial concept of *creativity* according to which it is perceived as a spontaneous self-expression. The underlying reason for the idea is that penetration of modern technologies into the domain of artistic creativity destroys the human essence, and turning creativity into a technological process leads to inevitable destruction of a creative process.

**Key words:** communication, creative activities, technologies, creative technologies, values

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## INTRODUCTION

We have to admit that something important is happening in the Western world, or perhaps it has already happened, but we are not aware of it yet or we do not want to be aware of it. This important and perhaps inevitable process of globalization is related to the latest information technologies and to the more and more intensive scientific and cultural exchanges. A significant symptom of what is happening now is a rapid penetration of new terminology

into scientific and cultural discourse. Such terms as “culture/art factory”, “creative industries”, “business/science/art incubator”, “science and technology parks”, “social/business/mediation technologies”, “communication and mediation”, etc. have already filled the Internet sites and have even become widely used in the institutionalized scientific, cultural and political vocabulary and public discourses.

The phenomena of creativity and communication are closely linked to the mentioned terms and they have been addressed by different Lithuanian scholars (Barevičiūtė 2014; Černevičiūtė, Strazdas 2014; Kardelis 2005; Klibavičius 2013; Mickūnas 2012, 2013; Pruskus 2013, 2014; Saldukaitytė 2013; Stoškus 2014; Urmonas 2007; Žukauskaitė 2013) among whom Kačerauskas’ (2014a, b, c, d) ideas distinguish themselves. However, none of them poses questions what the terms describing modern technologies mean indeed and what the origin and the reasons of the term usage are. Thus, this paper aims to discuss these questions, and the focus is primarily on the Lithuanian cultural context. Also, the paper sets to analyze the axiological aspect of creative technologies which seems to have received insufficient attention so far. It is attempted to show that the most recent scientific axiology (it is also called formal axiology) based on rather formal social technologies and the so called “value mathematics” cannot do without essential (central) values, which reveal human beings’ creative powers and which underline individual and unique emotional or spiritual human reality.

## MANIFESTATION OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY IN TERMINOLOGY OF CREATIVITY

It has to be admitted that two problems arise while discussing rapid penetration of technology-related terms into the processes of scientific, cultural, political and public discourse. First and foremost is the question what the so-called technologies are indeed and what their ontological status related to human existential being is. However, this problem will not be addressed in the paper in-depth, only some axiological aspects will be discussed.

The second problem, closely related to the first one, does not seem to be particularly complicated at first glance. It can be presented in the following way: Why did Lithuanians, being purists in terms of the Lithuanian language, start using collocations with technologies not of Lithuanian origin? Instead of using the Lithuanian word “tarpininkavimas” (English: *mediation*), why do they say and write the international word “mediacija” (English: *mediation*)? Moreover, this marked tendency can be observed not only on the Internet where more flexible rules are applied, but also it can be seen while discussing serious scientific problems (for example, Milašius 2007) or this word is used in the names of institutions (for example, the Institute of Communication and Mediation in Mykolas Romeris University, The Institute of Mediation in Vilnius, etc.). However, there are some cases when the word “mediacija” (English: *mediation*) is explained taking into account the Lithuanian equivalent. For example, the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania delivered information (Civilinių ginčų taikinamasis tarpininkavimas (mediacija) 2008), which clearly indicates that by the term of *mediation* they mean “civilinis taikomas tarpininkavimas” (English: *civil reconciliation mediation*). Alas, such cases are likely to be a rare exception. The same applies to the widely spread term “komunikacija” (English: *communication*) which originates from the Latin verb *communicare* which means “to share” and from *communis* which means “common”. Lithuanian dictionaries offer a wide range of Lithuanian equivalents of this word such as “bendravimas” (English: *interaction, communication*), “keitimasis mintimis, žiniomis, patirtimi” (English: *sharing ideas, knowledge, experience*) or even “ryšiai” (English: *liaison*). Also, we have already forgotten other Lithuanian equivalents of international words. The question arises why it is happening like that.

The first plausible answer to this question appears to be rather straightforward. This and similar technology-related terms have already become entrenched in international usage. Thus, taking into account the development of scientific and cultural exchange, the usage of Lithuanian terms as opposed to international ones would be unreasonable. However, we are likely to confront a more serious problem. Mechanical replacement of Lithuanian words by international ones often “bleaches” their underlying meanings, which could be understood only by people who have used this language since their birth. Not only the language but also thinking and feelings seem to become “flat” and oriented towards replacement of natural human relationship by artificial, planned in advance, calculated or perhaps deliberately manipulated. Fortunately, we do not say “Mes pukiiai *pakomunikavome*” (English: *We had a nice communication*) while having a glass of wine or beer, but we say “Mes puikiai *pabendravome*” (English: *We mixed happily with other people*). However, the journalists tend to use the following utterances quite often: “Šie politikai (verslininkai, mokslininkai, etc.) *komunikavo* neformalioje aplinkoje” (English: *These politicians communicated in informal surroundings*). The use of the international word “komunikuoti” (English: *communicate*) sounds slightly odd because the Lithuanian language contains more traditional means of expressing the same idea (for example, “bendrauti” (English: *communicate*)). Why cannot the journalists use Lithuanian words and say that politicians were interacting, that is, they exchanged their opinions, experience, impressions, that they were laughing, getting angry, rejoicing or even tightening fists? This is, however, far from the understanding of “communication” as it is perceived by specialists of information technologies. Why do not we use Lithuanian words to name the faculties of universities? For instance, would not it be more reasonable to use the Lithuanian wording “Bendravimo fakultetas” (English: *The Faculty of Communication*) or “Bendrustės fakultetas” (English: *The Faculty of Communication*) instead of “Komunikacijos fakultetas” (English: *The Faculty of Communication*)? The Lithuanian wording would result in disclosing the intrinsic nature of faculties (of the humanities particularly) and of universities as well. It seems that the term “komunikacija” (English: *communication*) destroys the underlying idea of the faculty because it is mostly related to mechanical communication using electronic devices but not face-to-face interaction. No doubt this suggestion is preposterous and naïve because by using the term “komunikacija” (English: *communication*), it is attempted to emphasize abilities to acquire complex social, political, etc. networks and technologies (social technologies including). Inevitably, the term of “mediacija” (English: *mediation*) has replaced the term of “tarpininkavimas” (English: *mediation*) because face-to-face human interaction has been replaced by technical forms of human activities and information and communication technologies. Indeed, such names as “menų fabrikas” (English: *Art Factory*) or “mokslo (ar meno) inkubatorius” (English: *science (or art) incubator*) have not appeared incidentally. Therefore, the question posed here is: What is behind these processes and what are underlying meanings of these new terms?

In attempt to answer this question I will provide one example. In the premises of the former radio factory ELFA in Vilnius, an institution LOFTAS (English: *loft*), naming itself *Art Factory*, based itself ([www.menufabrikas.lt](http://www.menufabrikas.lt)). Although this institution introduces itself as a cultural centre comprising visual arts, music, cinema, theatre, fashion, dance experiments, interactive cross-disciplinary forms of arts and even different types of alternative sporting activities, the very listing of “forms of cross-disciplinary art” (not speaking about types of alternative sporting activities) raises serious doubts whether this is a *centre of arts and culture*. On the one hand, why not to name the institution this way if we consider culture in its broadest sense as everything that is connected with human activities and artefacts. On the other hand, the idea of

disciplines within arts is contested. Is there such thing as “cross-disciplinary arts”? The question is rhetorical in the sense that even asking it presupposes a negative answer. Creativity, or *poiēsis*, as Aristotle used the term, or poetry as we use the word now, does not submit to any discipline, that is, it never follows any strict rules established in advance. Aristotle pointed out that we have to see the difference between the possibility of *creating* and the possibility of *acting*:

In the variable are included both things made and things done; making and acting are different. <...> All art is concerned with coming into being, i. e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made. <...> Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting (<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html>).

Aristotle’s idea naturally leads to the conclusion that artistic creativity is not an ordinary activity which can be defined by using such words as “gaminimas” (English: *making, producing*), “amatas” (English: *trade*), “fabrikas” (English: *factory*). It is genuinely spontaneous and the source of creativity is still being under heated discussion (Kačerauskas 2014a). Although disciplinary purity has been mandatory in science so far, more and more research is conducted of cross-disciplinary and even transdisciplinary nature (Kanišauskas 2011). However, it has to be admitted that the usage of the term “cross-disciplinary forms of art” is symptomatic. It shows that even art has become entrapped by instrumental mind and that artistic creativity is equated to a factory (Latin: *fabrica*); that is, it is seen as a large industrial mechanized enterprise or factory, in which indeed only few people are involved in creative activities, whereas the rest perform mechanical and repetitive work rather than creative. By the way, the term of “industrijos” (English: *industries*; Latin: *industria*, meaning diligence) is used synonymously with the term “pramonė” (English: *industry*) which in turn is explained as factories or enterprises which process raw material. Consequently, creative industries should be understood as particular factories which due to the newest technologies (social including) process not only the “raw material” but also the participants who take part in the processes. Stoškus (2014) holds similar views and asserts that cinema and theatre “industries” are particularly prone to such technological changes. Theatre directors seem to merely ignore the playwrights’ (as well as scriptwriters’) rights and “process raw material” (texts of plays and dramas) the way they like. Most of those people who thought of themselves as creative people and other people considered them as such ones (actors, actresses) have ceased to be them. According to Stoškus (2014), actors and actresses have become marionettes who only perform directors’ instructions. If they improvise, they do this within the directors’ set boundaries. They have become things among things but not creative human beings.

Alas, the spread of the term of “inkubatorius” (English: *incubator*) is no less symptomatic. On the Internet, along with the traditional meaning of this word (a machine like a box where eggs are kept warm until the young birds are born (OALD, 2015) used in advertising ([www.inkubatoriai.lt](http://www.inkubatoriai.lt)), we come across such names of institutions and associations as “Anykščių menų inkubatorius” ([www.anyksciumenai.lt](http://www.anyksciumenai.lt)) (English: *Anykščiai Art Incubator*), “Užupio menų inkubatorius” ([www.umi.lt/inkubatorius/](http://www.umi.lt/inkubatorius/)) (English: *Užupis Art Incubator*), “Audiovizualinių menų industrijos inkubatorius” ([www.amiincubator.com.lt](http://www.amiincubator.com.lt)) (English: *The Incubator of Audio-visual Art Industries*), etc. This inevitably leads to the questions what the word “incubator” means indeed and what is its meaning in relation to business or art.

It does not make any difficulties to answer the first question. As it was indicated above, dictionaries and encyclopaedias offer the following definition (from Latin *incubare* which means

“to hatch”): a machine like a box where eggs are kept warm until the young birds are born (OALD, 2015). The second question how to relate artificial hatching of chickens to business or art seems to be more complicated. In terms of logics, it is impossible. Therefore, an assumption can be accepted that the term of incubator employed in the names of institutions and associations is used in the figurative sense, that is, metaphorically. It leads to the inference that similarly to chickens which are artificially hatched in machine-like boxes, future artists or businessmen are supposed to be “hatched”, that is, they are trained by employing artificial methods based on modern technologies. This is likely to be the true nature of the terms of “art” or “business incubators”.

Surprisingly, even the supposed creative education process of future artists is equated to technically-based production, factories and industries. Creative process is becoming a technology which is defined in terms of creative industries as industry comprising art, technologies and enterprise (Kačerauskas 2014a). Cinema, theatre, radio and television, publishing, games, toys, design, architecture and other spheres are ascribed to creative industries. According to the American philosopher Florida, creative industries are generated by the Creative Class, that is, by people who create economic values through their creative activities (Kačerauskas 2014d). Taking into consideration this idea, it turns out that such artists as Vincent Van Gogh or Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis do not belong to the Creative Class because they almost did not sell their works while being alive and they did not contribute to their own or (and) the society's economic welfare (ibid.). Apparently, the artist faces a problem: the more original works of art are, the more difficult it is to sell them and to participate in “economic life” and to become a member of the Creative Class. In attempt to show the problems which creative industries face in different regions of Poland, Klimczuk (2014) points out that not all scientists relate creative industries to economics and that the term of creative industries is first and foremost associated with non-traditional forms of art and non-traditional spheres of culture (for instance, software and tourism technologies or telecommunication). However, he admits that creative industries are at the core of contemporary global economics. Technologies (creative technologies including) became methods and rational ways based on instrumental mind how to operate more effectively, efficiently, economically, usefully and finally more persuasively. According to Mickūnas (2012: 57–58), instrumental mind is the mind which is capable of calculating states' resources and their distribution in line with its ideologically-established rules. Mickūnas (2013: 90, 121) sees this tendency as instrumental rationality which in fact is irrational<sup>1</sup>, that is, it is related not to *logos* but to the idea of human power and materialization of nature when objective reality is understood only as a sum of material parts where human reality is not an exception and humanity is not distinguished from other material things and events.

Unfortunately, instead of becoming creative activities, art in the traditional sense of the word or at least trade (artisans sell the largest part of their production and they participate in “economic life”, thus they can be ascribed to the “creative class”), creative technologies are becoming a means of how to manage more efficiently, how to receive or influence something or perhaps how to manipulate the human consciousness. It seems that creative technologies have found themselves entrapped in instrumental mind.

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<sup>1</sup> This statement can be corroborated by neuroscientist David Eagleman's (2014: 143–146) findings and conclusions. When banks advertise big risk loans, they tell people that this choice is the most rational (reasonable). However, the findings suggest that when people encounter advertising and take decisions, the most intensive work is carried out by the parts of the brains which are responsible for irrational emotions but not for rational decisions.

## CREATIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF VALUES

The latter statement may seem declarative and rhetorical if it is not discussed in a particular context. I will illustrate this by Albert Borgman's (2003) ideas put forward in one of his interviews. In the paper dedicated to the present state of philosophy of technical sciences, the Canadian science philosopher Andrew Feenberg (2004) describes Borgman as an influential contemporary philosopher of technical sciences and analyzes his ideas in the contexts of Heidegger and Habermas' philosophy. Feenberg admits that despite significant differences in their philosophical outlooks, they describe technical activities in the same way; they think in "non-technical values" and suggest substantial theories of technologies, which hold that technologies are not neutral because the tools we use shape our lifestyle in the modern society. According to the philosophers, means and aims cannot be separated, therefore, the development of technologies transform everything what is human.

On the one hand, Borgman emphasizes that human beings have already "tamed" technologies – technological procedures and technological devices have already become part of our culture and life, they make our life more comfortable and they are more significant than we think. On the other hand, Borgman asserts that a philosopher should also be concerned with the problem of responsibility. What happens when technologies start developing outside their not falsified essence and liberate us from responsibility which we should not try to avoid? Should we avoid responsibility when we talk about "life factories" imposed on us by contemporary technologies? No doubt that the answer is "no". As Borgman maintains, technologies have started moving towards the centre of life with the aim to "colonize" it and people have no idea when to say "Stop!" to them. Together with the accepted explanations why technologies are almost worshipped (according to Borgman, this happens because the technological movement is deeply entrenched in economics, and because liberal democracy posited an idea that human beings are unable to decide what is good in their lives), the philosopher names one more important reason which seems to have been largely overlooked. He claims that the nature of human beings contains a burning desire to worship their own creativity and what people create themselves. It might be, as Borgman thinks, that this prevents us from saying "Stop!" to the accelerated and uncontrolled development of technologies.

Feenberg agrees with Borgman's ideas and points out that this philosopher puts much emphasis on the so called "paradigm of devises and mechanisms", which proposes that efficiency of activities is the major purpose of technological society. Borgman maintains that it marginalizes the most important and focal things in human life. Focal things are understood as everything that joins people for shared activities, everything that has intrinsic value and that does not serve and cannot serve the functional attitude to life. In attempt to explain the concept of focal things, Borgman employs clear examples. In terms of functional attitude, eating is considered to be a technical operation or "ingesting calories", and we can always assess if the calories were consumed efficiently or not. In traditional family, however, eating is more than "ingesting calories". Every time the ritual of eating enhances the unity of family, being together and these things are considered to be focal. However, as Borgman puts it, due to new technologies food has become easily obtainable and the need of being together has diminished significantly. This leads inevitably to alienation in families.

According to Feenberg, though Borgman's critique of technological society narrows and illustrates Heidegger and Habermas' major themes, this philosopher does not provide any constructive suggestions how to reform the present attitude to technologies. However, the illustrative example of the "eating ritual" presented by Borgman seems to convincingly show

the essence of the “instrumental mind”. Moreover, it allows us understanding what is meant by “non-technical values”, which can easily be called “non-instrumental values”.

The latter term (“non-instrumental values”) was used not randomly. Along with other meanings, explanatory dictionaries, encyclopaedias (Dabartinės lietuvių kalbos žodynas 2012; Vaitkevičiūtė 2007; The Concise Oxford Thesaurus 1997) define the word “technika” (*mechanism, technology*) as machines, mechanisms, gadgets, tools and *instruments* as the total of all of historically-developed manufacturing tools (*instruments*) and skills what allows the humanity changing the natural environment. Thus, it becomes evident that instead of using the term of “non technical values”, we can successfully use the term of “non-instrumental values”. Admittedly, there are more important aspects. Both Freenberg and Borgman analyze technologies taking into account values, whereas in axiology (which can also be called as the philosophical theory of values), values fall into two completely opposite types: intrinsic and attributive (or instrumental). Even analytical philosophers who are very attentive to the preciseness of terms adhere to this classification of values (Axiology: A Theory of Value 2014; The Science of Axiology 2014; Value Theory 2012). This typology of values is grounded on the assumption that objects and subjects are valued through reason (logical evaluation), through immediate perceptive experience (empirical, instrumental evaluation) and intuitively (emotional evaluation), though each of these types of evaluation are based on different criteria. Attributive values are often called instrumental because in the process of evaluation particular empirical instruments are employed (for example, a unit of length is used while assessing (measuring) trees, chronometers are used in order to measure sprinters’ running time, the number and complexity of dancers’ passages, etc.). To sum up, attributive or instrumental values have a characteristic that they can be quantitatively and qualitatively measured with the focus being on the relativity and volatility of their evaluation. The adherents of instrumental mind support the idea that assessment of any objects should necessarily be related to perceptual experience, measurable and verifiable. Any mind-related statements, such as subjective attitudes of being “bigger”, “smaller”, “more beautiful”, “uglier”, “nobler”, “more loyal”, “more righteous”, etc., should find their directly-experienced equivalents in reality and be able to measure the degree and quantity of “size”, “loyalty”, or “righteousness”. This is possible to achieve by fixation and measuring the reactions of human organism to the said words or statements (behavioural approach). There is one more view proposing that it is possible to achieve it by formalizing at least part of concepts subjected to evaluation and modelling evaluation possibilities via modern electronic computing systems (formal approach). Both approaches can be considered as instrumental ones. This term implies that objects under evaluation and the processes of evaluation (thus, values) are viewed only as physical objects not taking into consideration their specificities and qualitative differences.

Robert S. Hartman’s *Science of Value or Formal Axiology*<sup>2</sup> (Smith 2014) proposed in 1995 could be considered as the most significant example of instrumental evaluation. Although it is based on completely rational postulates, the concepts of values are formalized finding their equivalents in logical and mathematical symbols and their relations. Values and evaluations are modelled instrumentally (analogically to physical processes). What is more, the theory puts forward the ways how to influence social processes and individual behaviour of people that allows attaining success in personal life, at work, in business, economics and production more effectively.

<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, three Hartman(n)s considerably contributed to the study of axiology. Karl Robert Eduard Hartmann (1842–1906), Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) and Robert S. Hartman (1910–1973). One letter difference in the names of the philosophers should be noted. Robert S. Hartman was nominated for the Nobel Prize for the seminal work on formal axiology.

Hartman's formal axiology sharply distinguishes from others in two aspects. First, along with the instrumental values which are called extrinsic and the essential values which are called intrinsic, Hartman introduces the third dimension, which he calls *systemic values*. Apparently, the systemic values are easily formalized because they have to do with perfection and completeness, which can be achieved due to structured systemic thinking based on laws, rules and clear procedures, and adjusting obligation to possibilities. Systemic evaluation requires either to submit to the "law" (formal constructs showing how to behave or act) or not to submit to it, that is to break it. This requirement is well illustrated by a classic example: a woman is either pregnant or not. The state cannot be in between. As a rule, systemic evaluation is often applied at the initial stages of candidate's selection to particular positions, university admission, bestowing awards for achievements in science or art. Candidates should comply with certain requirements established in advance, and the decisions taken are "either-or": a candidate meets the requirements or does not. Only then the *essential evaluation* (selecting candidates for science and art awards) and the *non-essential evaluation* (selecting candidates for particular positions) are carried out. Systemic evaluation is normative, that is certain standards are set in advance.

The second distinguishing characteristic of formal axiology is that Hartman heavily focuses on *intrinsic values* along with the systemic ones (or instrumental values), which he relates to practical thinking, experience and instrumental studies and which are firmly grounded on the comparison of elements in the real (material) world (good, better, the best, etc.) and on the possibility to apply these elements in practical activities. This focus might be viewed as paradoxical because while putting emphasis on formalizing possibilities of two values (instrumental and systemic) and proposing composition and transposition methods of value profiles, Hartman clearly underlines that together with the discussed dimensions of values, there are instrumentally non-assessable values, which he calls intrinsic and which, according to Feenberg and Borgman, are non-instrumental or non-technical values. It has to be noted that though Hartman includes intrinsic values in his formalized system of values, he does this employing profiles of values, which he describes as identifying unique value patterns of personal value norms, as personal life story profiles in time. Every value profile can be expressed in a mathematical formula in the so-called value mathematics. Composition and transposition methods of values and their measurement are based on symbolic logic, which says that a thing is good as much as it meets its conceptual definition and each property of the thing is more worth than another property, depending on the level of abstraction (conceptualization). This way purely instrumental assessment of things is related only to conceptually definable values that Hartman and other analytical philosophers define as intrinsic. Intrinsic values are understood as a person or thing's real life dimension. Intrinsic evaluation rejects any comparison and assessable objects or subjects are evaluated as they are in individual, exclusive and unique emotional or spiritual reality. In Kant's terms, intrinsic value is a value that the thing has "in itself," or "for its own sake". When using this understanding, we encounter the so-called non-instrumental values. The relation between the assessable object and subject becomes concurrent and self-contained. When people say to each other "You are the only one in the world!" or "I love you because you are", they try to say that this person is unique and cannot be replaced by any other, though this assessment is impossible to measure or base on rational assumptions. Furthermore, when people say "This legacy is invaluable", they mean not its factual value which could be expressed in money but that the legacy (scientific, literal, historical, etc., or even a house where a person spent his childhood) has intrinsic value because it is impossible to explain why it is so invaluable; you can only feel it and relive it. What

is invaluable (what has intrinsic value) for one person might be unimportant and valueless for others because they are not personally attached to it become, let us assume, the childhood house is abandoned and shabby. But for the person who experienced the most pleasurable part of his life in the house, it will be dear and invaluable. The intrinsic value is the manifestation of love, liking, personal relationships, empathy or any other intuitive feeling. It is focused on seeing the human being as the whole. When artists assess their works intrinsically, they are confident that painting is intrinsic manifestation of their personal being. When businessmen assess their children intrinsically, they love them despite what they are. They will provide them with business possibilities even if the children do not show any inclination to business. The businessmen's decision will be "They are my children!" No wonder that this decision is justifiable because the family is the central thing for such businessmen. The same applies to lovers for whom the central thing is "the only person in the world", the same as having dinner together with the family is not a "technical operation" but a central thing – the intrinsic, non-instrumental value, which lies at the heart of a family-loving and being in family person.

Thus, it becomes evident that in human reality even in formal scientific axiology, which employs technological terms and purely technological procedures, or as Borgman called the paradigm of devices and mechanisms, there are completely opposite things within the same paradigm, which are impossible to reduce to technical procedures and technical terms are not used to describe them.

If an artist, sculptor, actor, architect, dancer, composer, scientist or craftsman assesses their creativity intrinsically, if they are convinced that what they do is meaningful and it is manifestation of their intrinsic personal being, they will never attribute their creative activities to a factory, industry, technologies or boxes for thatching chickens.

It has to be admitted, however, that such relations have already become widespread. Hence, the conclusion could be drawn that either creative artists and scientists ceased to exist and only those, "things among things", in terms of Stoškus, who obey somebody's will, remained, or the philosophical thinking has not fully grasped the so admired influence of technologies on human existence and has not appreciated the peculiarities of paradigm changes, correlation of cultural identity and its development. Thus, it seems that a more extensive research should be conducted.

## CONCLUSIONS

We can hardly avoid using technical terms in contemporary scientific and art (cultural in general) discourse. However, we can make a serious attempt to come back to the initial understanding of creative activity as spontaneous self-expression. This coming back is highly important because the penetration of modern technologies into the sphere of artistic creativity is likely to destroy the essence of humanity; moreover, "technologizing" creativity seems to lead to the disruption of a creative process.

Even scientific axiology based on formal social technologies is not able to tackle the value problems related to human creative activities if individual and unique emotional and spiritual human states are not taken into account. This fact corroborates intuitive understanding that technologies should serve as a supplementary tool in creative activities but not a self-contained goal. Furthermore, technologies should not (or perhaps are not capable) to overshadow transcendental powers of human creativity.

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## Kūrybinės technologijos instrumentinio proto gniaužtuose

### *Santrauka*

Pasitelkiant pavyzdžius, straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kodėl kūrybiniai procesai vis dažniau siejami su technika ir technologijomis, ir tai ryškiai regima net institucionalizuotame moksliniame, kultūriniame ir politiniame leksikone, viešuose diskursuose. Atkreipiamas dėmesys, kad technologijos (taip pat ir kūrybinės) tampa instrumentiniu protu grindžiamais metodais, kur iš esmės glūdi siekis viską atlikti efektyviau, našiau, ekonomiškiau, naudingiau. Taip kūryba praranda savo tikrąją esmę, tampa ne tik ekonominėmis kategorijomis apibrėžiama preke, bet ir priemone efektyviau valdyti, nulemti, gal net manipuluoti žmogaus sąmone. Moderniosios technologijos į paribius išstumia viską, kas žmogaus gyvenime yra „centriniai dalykai“, visa tai, kas suburia žmones bendrai veiklai, turi savo vidinę vertę. Parodoma, kad net formaliomis socialinėmis technologijomis ir taip vadinamąja „vertybių matematika“ grindžiama mokslinė aksiologija nepajėgi išspręsti su kūrybine žmogiškąja esme susijusių vertybinių problemų, jeigu neatsižvelgiama į esminį (centrinį), turintį savo vidinę vertę, asmens ar dalyko vertinimą, t. y. tokį vertinimą, kuris akcentuoja individualią, unikalią jausminę ir dvasinę žmogiškąją tikrovę. Daroma išvada, kad kūrybos „technologizavimas“ veda link kūrybinio proceso žlugdymo.

**Raktažodžiai:** komunikacija, kūryba, technika, kūrybinės technologijos, vertybės