

# The Pending Revolution: Kant as a Moral Revolutionary

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Kant controversially opposed political revolutions; yet, in morality, he clearly encouraged a revolutionary attitude. Drawing especially on the relevant texts in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the *Religion*, the *Education* and the *Anthropology*, I explore the conceptual underpinnings of Kant's position, arguing that Kant's contrast between moral revolution and reform is at the basis of his twofold notion of noumenal and phenomenal virtue, which in turn explains the contrast he draws between principled versus imitative behaviour in the *Education*. On this basis, I defend the complementary role of political reform and moral revolution in his approach to cultural progress.

**Keywords:** moral change, virtue, cultural progress, *habitus libertatis*, ethical community

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## INTRODUCTION

Kant was revolutionary in many senses<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, his stance on the French Revolution has always puzzled interpreters (Reiss 1956; Beck 1971; Atwell 1971; Axinn 1971; Nicholson 1976; Hill 2002; Maliks 2014): his declared sympathy for that Revolution is not reflected in positions he conveyed in the *Doctrine of Right*, where he clearly states that the establishment of a republican constitution should take place through gradual reform and not through revolution (MS, AA 06: 319–20), through evolution rather than revolution (Beck 1971: 414), *metamorphosis* rather than *palingenesis* (Williams 2001). Yet, in a striking contrast with his explicit position regarding political change, when it comes to moral change, we find him defending revolution instead of, or at least as a pre-condition for, gradual reforms. Thus, at the end of the first book of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, he writes

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<sup>1</sup> Quotations from Kant's works follow the volume and page in the Akademie's Edition: Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften Hrsg.: Bd. 1–22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin 1900ff. The following abbreviations will be used: *Metaphysics of Morals*: MS, AA 06; *Critique of Practical Reason*: KpV, AA 05; *Critique of the Power of Judgement*: KU, AA 05; *Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone*: RGV, AA 06; *Anthropology, History, and Education*: Päd, AA 09; *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*: IaG, AA 08; *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: Anth. AA 07; *An Old Question Raised Again: 'Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?'*: SF, AA 07.

“that a human being should become *not merely good, but morally good* (pleasing to God) i.e. virtuous according to the intelligible character of virtue (*virtus noumenon*) and thus in need of no other incentive to recognize a duty except the representation of duty itself – that, so long as the foundation of the maxims of the human beings remains impure, *cannot be effected through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the disposition of the human being* (a transition to the maxim of holiness of disposition). And so a ‘new man’ can come about only through a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation (Jn, 3:5, compare with Gn 1, 2) and a change of heart” (RGV, AA 06:47; emphasis added).

In what follows, my purpose is to investigate the nature of this moral revolution, and assess its role in what we could describe as an ideal theory of cultural progress. I intend to show that Kant’s contrast between revolution and moral reform is at the basis of his twofold notion of *noumenal* and *phenomenal* virtue, and partly explains the contrast he draws between principled *versus* imitative behaviour in the *Education*. These contrasts, in turn, justify Kant’s twofold approach to moral progress – both from morality to culture and from culture to morality –, as well as the ethical requirement of attempting both a “revolution in the mode of thought” and a “reform in the mode of sense”.

### **VIRTUS NOUMENON AND PHAENOMENON: CHANGING ONE’S HEART *VERSUS* CHANGING ONE’S MORES**

A few lines before the above passage, Kant had noted that,

“When the firm resolve to comply with one’s duty has become a habit, it is called virtue also in a legal sense, in its empirical character (*virtus phaenomenon*). Virtue here has the abiding maxim of lawful actions, no matter whence one draws the incentives that the power of choice needs for such actions. Virtue, in this sense, is accordingly acquired little by little, and to some it means a long habituation (in the observance of the law), in virtue of which a human being, through gradual reformation of conduct and consolidation of his maxims, passes from a propensity to vice to its opposite” (RGV, AA 06: 47).

Kant’s distinction between ‘merely good’ and ‘morally good’ involves a difference between human goodness and moral goodness, which, to a certain extent, finds a parallel in Aristotle’s distinction between natural and moral virtue. However, Kant’s notion of moral virtue underlines the inner disposition, which should inspire our good works in a way that goes far beyond the Aristotelian requirement of doing the right thing deliberately and for the right reason. This aspect can be most clearly observed in the strong contrast he draws between acting for the right reason and acting out of habit. While for Aristotle acting out of habit does not necessarily exclude acting for the right reason, Kant speaks of habits in ways which seem to curtail inner freedom. Hence, the contrast he draws between ‘being good’ and being ‘morally good’ is presented as the contrast between *virtus phaenomenon* and *virtus noumenon*. Thus, by *virtus phaenomenon*, Kant means the habit of performing one’s duty, which is why he also speaks of virtue ‘in a legal sense’ (Suprenant 2014: 14). On the other hand, he refers to *virtus noumenon*, meaning virtue rooted in the inner disposition – not just performing one’s duty, but rather doing it out of duty. In Kant’s view, this ‘noumenal virtue’ cannot be simply inferred from external behaviour and cannot simply be effected through a gradual reform of *mores* because it requires a true *change of heart*. By contrast, if we are simply talking about the genesis of *virtus phaenomenon*,

“not the slightest change of heart is necessary...; only a change of *mores*. A human being here considers himself virtuous whenever he feels himself stable in his maxims of observance to duty – though not by virtue of the supreme ground of all maxims, namely duty” (RGV, AA 06: 47).

*Bourgeois* morality, i.e. behaving in accordance with social convention, does not require the revolution that Kant considers necessary to speak of moral virtue, although it surely needs a certain degree of refinement and civilization, for which a measure of pragmatic and, hence, interested reason suffices. Thus, after drawing this contrast between change of *mores* and change of heart, Kant introduces the passage quoted above, linking *virtus noumemon* with a revolution in the disposition of one’s heart and compares it with some sort of new creation (Surprenant 2014: 15). While this comparison invites the reader to interpret it as a secularization of the theological doctrine of grace, it is also possible to read it as a continuation of the contrast between habit as *assuetudo* and habitus *libertatis*, which Kant himself introduced in the *Doctrine of Virtue*.

### ASSUETUDO VERSUS HABITUS LIBERTATIS

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant writes:

“An aptitude (*habitus*) is a facility in acting and a subjective perfection of choice. But not every such facility is a free aptitude (*habitus libertatis*), for if it is a habit (*assuetudo*), that is, a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore not a moral aptitude. Hence virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in conformity with law unless there is added ‘to determine oneself to act through the thought of the law’. And then this aptitude is not a property of choice but of the will, which is a faculty of desire that, in adopting a rule, also gives it a universal law. Only such an aptitude can be counted as virtue” (MS, AA 06: 407).

By sharply distinguishing between free and circumscribed aptitudes, Kant clarifies what he means by ‘moral aptitude,’ i.e. not just any subjective perfection of choice that enables us to act in conformity with the law, but rather an aptitude that results from an agent’s own will to act through thinking about the law. Conveyed in these terms, Kant’s approach to virtue is seen as not only different from that of Aristotle but, especially, from that of Hume – who, while stressing the importance of motives, largely entrusted the efficacy of morality to custom. Kant thinks moral virtue is necessary for human beings to have inner freedom, which amounts to ruling rather than being ruled by their affects and passions:

“Two things are required for inner freedom: being one’s own master in a given case (*animus sui compos*), and ruling oneself (*imperium in semetipsum*), that is, subduing one’s affects and governing one’s passions” (AA 06: 407).

Virtue promotes the *Autocracy* of practical reason (MS, AA 06: 384), which entails something more than the “autonomy of practical reason” because it does not just refer to the fact that we are ruled by our own law, but also to the fact that we are practically enabled to rule our behaviour in this way through the possession of virtue (Baxley 2010; 2015). This means that, for human beings, subject as we are to the influence of inclinations, there is no other doctrine of morals than a doctrine of virtue. Yet, the fact that human beings are persistently influenced by inclinations explains that virtue itself is not just a practical endowment, but also an *ideal*. Morally virtuous agents can never take their virtue for granted; they cannot simply rely on what they have already achieved, but rather need to be alert so that they can defend the sovereignty of reason:

“Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning. It is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a duty. That it always starts from the beginning has a subjective basis in human nature, which is affected by inclinations because of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking” (MS, AA 06: 409).

Simply put, the fact that we human beings are subject to the influence of inclinations means that the work of virtue is never finished. It is always a work in progress, and not just because of the resistance that we might find in our inclinations, but rather because, along with the good principle – the law, there is always another principle operating within us that tries to subordinate the law to our own private advantage. For this reason, the moral revolution aimed at restoring the proper order of incentives always has to be started anew. This is also the reason why we should never entrust moral virtue to habituation alone:

“For, moral maxims, unlike technical ones, cannot be based on habit (since this belongs to the natural constitution of the will’s determination); on the contrary, if the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty” (MS, AA 06: 409).

In Kant’s view, moral maxims are separated from technical ones because the latter could be based solely on habit; by contrast, the former requires that the subject not be led merely by feeling, custom, or whatever other principle lessens his or her inner commitment or endorsement of the law. Thus, the contrast between technical maxims and moral maxims is at the basis of Kant’s rejection of the traditional definition of virtue as a habit (MS, AA 06: 383–4). Kant is concerned with the possibility of entrusting all education to habit (Päd, AA 09: 475) because he thinks of habit mainly as a lasting inclination that, once induced by imitation, could be perpetuated mechanically without regard to principled behaviour.

### IMITATIVE *VERSUS* PRINCIPLED BEHAVIOUR

Kant thinks that imitation of good examples plays a role in the upbringing of a child; however, education merely based on imitation does not contribute to the formation of moral character, which is precisely what enables the agent to confront diverse situations (MS, AA 06: 479–80). In Kant’s view, habits born out of imitation are just mechanic principles of behaviour; this link between imitation, habit, and mechanical education underlies his *Lectures on Pedagogy*:

“All educational art which arises merely mechanically must carry with it many mistakes and defects, because it has no plan for its formulation. The art of education or pedagogy must therefore become judicious if it is to develop human nature so that the latter can reach its vocation” (Päd, AA 09: 447).

For Kant, ‘mechanical education’ entails the risk of losing the ability to judge and will for oneself. This is why he advocates for what he calls ‘judicious education’, based on scientific principles (Päd, AA 09: 450–1), both at the individual and at the social level since both levels are actually interconnected (Päd, AA 09: 447). Indeed, for him, progress in education also depends on institutional progress, something that Kant deems hard, but not impossible, because nature has instilled in us the republican ideal towards which we should advance

(IaG, AA 00 8: 24). Now, if this advancement depended on us alone, it would be humanity's latest achievement because, in his view, such progress requires three conditions:

“<...> correct concepts of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience practiced through many courses of life and beyond this a good will that is prepared to accept it; three such items are very difficult ever to find all together, and if it happens, it will be only very late, after many fruitless attempts” (IaG, AA 08: 23–4).

The first of those conditions can partly be prepared through ‘natural developments’, which would persuade people to subscribe to a republican government by simply appealing to pragmatic reason. In his lectures on *Pedagogy*, he presents the second condition – ‘great experience practiced through many courses of life’ – as narrowly linked to the improvement of education. Hence, the main obstacle to achieving this condition lies in the fact that ‘insight depends on education and education in turn depends on insight’. Kant’s text suggests that improvements in government are significantly favoured by nature – or else by the conflict that arises from the collision of mere natural causes or interests (KU, AA 05: 432). By contrast, improvements in education are more directly dependent on enlightenment. While he was optimistic about his own times (Päd, AA 09: 444), he was aware of the problem of education (Päd, AA 09: 446) and saw the goal of an enlightened society still far off (Päd, AA 09: 445). Yet, it is the third requirement – ‘a good will prepared to accept’ a republican constitution – that represents the major obstacle for making any prediction in this regard. For how are we supposed to know anybody’s good will, especially given Kant’s own sharp distinction between inner dispositions and external performance? In this regard, it is remarkable that Kant himself took his contemporaries’ enthusiastic response to the French Revolution as a historical *sign* of a moral cause that had inserted itself into history (SF, AA 07: 84) as a sign that historical progress would no longer be solely entrusted to natural causes, or to pragmatic reason, but could rather be endorsed and promoted by human agents. Against this, it could still be argued that such willingness could only be effective provided that we already have a good moral disposition – that is, a disposition structured by consideration for the law –, for which we still need a moral revolution. This is especially the case if, as it happens, the moral cause manifests itself in the fact that people spontaneously sympathize with the revolutionaries without thereby endorsing their actions. After all, while Kant thinks a civil constitution represents the highest degree of *artificial improvement* of the human species toward its destiny, he is far from equating it with absolute moral progress. He even suggests that in a civil state animality could be more apparent than humanity (Anth, AA 07: 32); if this is not the case, it is more because of the domestication of our animal nature than because of a better moral condition. Indeed, superficial improvement could be due more to the civilizatory process than to real moral progress. Ultimately, this duality points at a discrepancy between the paths followed by nature and reason; while nature stimulates human beings to progress from culture to morality, reason prescribes the opposite route – progress from morality to culture:

“This is because nature within the human being strives to lead him from culture to morality, and not (as reason prescribes) beginning with morality and its law, to lead him to a culture designed to be appropriate to morality. This inevitably establishes a perverted, inappropriate tendency” (Anth, AA 07: 327–8).

This text summarizes Kant’s ideal approach to the issues of education and progress, which moves not from nature or culture to morality, but rather from morality to culture, even

if it has to be balanced with more pragmatic considerations in order to be feasible in practice (SE, AA 07: 92–3). Accordingly, we can speak of two paths to progress. The first is initiated by nature and worked out by pragmatic reason, leading to the establishment of a regime of right, within a republican constitution, compatible with moral reason. The second is initiated by enlightened moral reason, and requires a moral revolution aimed at establishing character within a moral community. In practice, both paths are intertwined. While the moral path cannot succeed if unaided by pragmatic reason, the natural path alone can never attain a moral community. In either case, Kant entrusts all true progress to adequate education (Päd, AA 09: 448), that is: principle-based education (Päd, AA 09: 480). Only this kind of culture can enable the human being to restore his nature so as to overcome the evil principle in him, which constitutes the heart of the moral revolution.

### LOOKING INSIDE THE MORAL REVOLUTION

In his *Pedagogy*, Kant writes that ‘the human being shall make himself better, cultivate himself, and, if he is evil, bring forth morality in himself’ (Päd, AA 09: 446). Yet, how is one supposed to operate this change, which amounts to, as it were, jumping over one’s shadow? *A transformation of one’s attitude of mind* is required, a moral revolution. Kant characterizes this transformation in another place as ‘conversion’, describing it as the *restoration* of the original predisposition toward the good in us:

“Conversion is an exit from evil and an entry into goodness... As an intellectual determination... this conversion is not two moral acts separated by a temporal interval but is rather a single act, since the abandonment of evil is possible only through the good disposition that effects the entrance into goodness, and *viceversa*” (RGV, AA 06: 74).

Indeed, the universal root of all vices is not to be identified with specific inclinations, which are naturally good, but rather with an evil tendency to privilege one’s welfare and happiness over morality – which nevertheless has also a root in the fact of reason. Accordingly, the moral revolution Kant speaks about can never consist in acquiring something we do not have – a good predisposition – because we already have it within us by the very fact that we are rational; rather, it consists in a sort of restoration of the sovereignty of the good (rational) principle. Hence, Kant explains the revolution in terms of *restoration of the purity of incentives* (RGV, AA 06: 46). For, Kant thinks that

“The human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. <...> In this reversal of incentives through a human being’s maxim contrary to the moral order, actions can still turn out to be as much in conformity to the law as if they had originated from true principles <...> The empirical character is then good but the intelligible character still evil” (RGV, AA 06: 36–37).

As long as this tendency to reverse the order of incentives persists, man’s intelligible character is evil. The approach is slightly, but importantly different from the one we find in *Anthropology*, where, focusing his attention on the species rather than in the individual, he considers that evil lies in man’s sensible character (Anth, AA 07: 324). In the *Religion*, by contrast, evil is rooted in the intelligible character, in the very principle of choice, because the focus is on the individual human being, on his principle of choice. This is why he writes that, in order to overcome the influence of the evil principle, we need “a revolution in the mode of thought”, which should be accompanied by a “gradual reformation in the mode of sense (which places

obstacles in the way of the former)” (RGV, AA 06: 47) In this way, Kant rescues the double dimension involved in the concept of moral virtue, namely, inner rectitude and a transformation of our sensibility such that makes our sensible nature receptive to the commands of reason. While the former aspect can be entrusted to decision, the latter points towards “incessant laboring and becoming.” (RGV, AA 06: 48) This twofold approach to human behaviour is at the basis of the twofold judgment that can be passed on human actions. A good heart proves itself more through continual striving improvement than through externally beautiful and successful deeds (RGV, AA 06: 48). This is not meant to disregard the importance of external deeds, nor, more generally, the external dimension of human actions – precisely the dimension that is apparent to other human beings. For, as Kant clearly emphasizes, the fact that we live among other human beings deeply influences our own moral dispositions, so much so that the restoration of the sovereignty of the good principle in us cannot be thought of as an individual achievement alone, but rather requires the constitution of an ethical community. Indeed, according to Kant, the very fact of social life creates a tendency in us that privileges happiness over morality and our own private interest above the morally good:

“It is not the instigation of nature that arouses what should properly be called the passions... Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among human beings. Nor is it necessary to assume that these are sunk into evil and are examples that lead him astray: it suffices that they are there, that they surround him, and that they are human beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition and make one another evil. If no means could be found to establish a union which has for its end the prevention of this evil and the promotion of the good in the human being – an enduring and ever expanding society, solely designed for the preservation of morality by counteracting evil with united forces – however much the individual human being might do to escape from the dominion of this evil, he would still be held in incessant danger of relapsing into it.” (RGV, AA 06: 93–4)

The fact that social life generates an atmosphere which sparks the evil principle suggests that victory over this evil principle largely depends on the development of an alternative social life (RGV, AA 06: 94–5; Anderson Gold, 2002; Moran, 2012). This ‘ethical community’, which he also designates as an ‘ethical state’ or a ‘kingdom of virtue’ (RGV, AA 06: 94–5), does not compete with the political community; it actually grows within it, albeit under different principles (RGV, AA 06: 94–5). This fact does not prevent us from tracing some analogies between them: we can thus speak of an ethical state of nature, very much like we speak of a juridical state of nature to refer to a state in which justice has not yet been secured (RGV, AA 06: 96). Thus, Kant also describes the situation of humanity before the moral revolution as an ethical state of nature and the transition to a proper ethical community as a duty of humanity towards itself rather than as a duty of the (individual) human being towards the (individual) human being (RGV, AA 06: 97). This duty is none other than the promotion of the highest good, understood as a good common to every species of rational beings – hence not just human beings (RGV, AA 06: 97–8). He describes this coherent and articulated whole as ‘a universal republic based on the laws of virtue’; and is quick to explain that such a republic cannot simply be equated with the result of each individual following the moral law in accordance with his or her own power. The point of that universal republic is precisely to structure interactions so that the republic advances towards a coherent whole (RGV, AA 06: 98). Accordingly, in the *Second Critique*, Kant argues that the actual realization of the duty of promoting the highest good involves faith in a higher moral being, who organizes all natural and

moral forces so as to give shape to that moral ideal (KpV, AA 05: 124–30; RGV, AA 06: 98). Like a juridical community, the constitution of an ethical community requires all individuals to be subject to public legislation; yet, in the case of ethical communities, the principle for that legislation is not simply to make the coexistence of freedom possible, but the promotion of virtue: not just mechanic virtue, but also a virtuous principle. Since virtue is mainly found in the internal disposition, the laws of an ethical community cannot be public in the same way: they can never be externally coerced. Hence Kant concludes that, ‘there must... be someone other than the people whom we can declare public lawgiver of an ethical community’, provided that the laws issued by this public lawgiver are not thought of as merely proceeding from this superior will because, in that case, there would be no autonomy and no ethical laws (RGV, AA 06: 99). In Kant’s view, it is only through the institution of such an ethical community, which unlike political communities is essentially universal (RGV, AA 06: 97), that we can oppose the evil principle, which, in turn, he represents as organizing a band (RGV, AA 06: 99–100). While this account of the fight between the good and the evil principles can be read as a secularization of Christianity, it also serves to the purpose of highlighting *the social dimension of the ethical revolution*: in order to effectively fight the evil principle in us, we need some sort of ethical community, which alone can counteract the social dimension of evil. Does this proposal reverse his initial thesis about the moral revolution, which should take place inside one’s own heart? I do not think so. In my view, this proposal simply makes explicit the full scope of that revolution. After all, from a constitutive point of view, the moral community corresponds with the structure of the moral imperative – the kingdom of ends. If the empirical realization of such community is subject to many constraints and obstacles, this is nothing new. Yet those very constraints explain the need not just for a revolution in the mode of thought, but also constant progress consisting in a gradual reformation in the mode of sense. Kant approaches moral progress establishing a parallel between God’s access “to the intelligible ground of the heart”, and the way human beings judge of human behaviour:

“For him who penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart ... for him to whom this endless progress is a unity, i.e. for God, this is the same as actually being a good human being (pleasing to him); and to this extent the change can be considered a *revolution*... for the judgment of human beings, <...> who can assess themselves and the strength of their maxims only by the upper hand they gain over the senses in time, the change is to be regarded only as an ever-continuing striving for the better, hence as a gradual reformation of the propensity to evil, of the perverted attitude of mind” (RGV, AA 06: 48).

While the inner revolution cannot be equated with the reformation of sense and mores, through the gradual reformation of sense and mores, we materialize our inner disposition and spread cultural progress.

## CONCLUSIONS

While Kant was a political reformist, he remained always a moral revolutionary. This stance is coherent with his praise of *virtus noumenon* over *virtus phaenomenon*, which explains also his preference for judicious over mechanical education. In all cases, real moral progress cannot be expected from mere natural or pragmatic forces. Nevertheless, moral *reform* does have a role to play in human life, for human life shares in both nature and reason, and both nature and reason may be brought closer to each other through culture. Thus, while Kant considers that culture can be approached both from a natural and a moral perspective, he thinks that human



beings should take a leading role in cultural developments. Indeed, in his view, the very dynamics of social life disturbs the operation of reason; this is why, in order to fight the evil principle in us, he deems necessary to strive toward some sort of ethical community, which, again, involves a revolution in the mode of thought, albeit framed in more social terms. The “social” dimension of the moral revolution, however, may serve to qualify the reformation in the mode of sense required by virtue, in terms of “civilization”. Indeed, the reformation in the mode of sense, required by phenomenal virtue, partially results from a gradual process of civilization, which in turn presupposes certain juridical institutions: this is why advocating the moral revolution ultimately entails commitment to the necessary political reforms. In this way, Kant’s moral revolution is articulated with his political reformism in a general theory of cultural progress.

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## Laukiama revoliucija: I. Kantas kaip moralinis revoliucionierius

### *Santrauka*

Immanuelis Kantas prieštaravo politinėms revoliucijoms, tačiau aiškiai skatino revoliucinį požiūrį moralinėje srityje. Atkreipiant dėmesį į filosofo veikalus – *Dorovės metafizikos pagrindai*, *Religija vien tik proto ribose*, straipsniuose *Apie pedagogiką* ir *Antropologija pragmatiniu požiūriu* nagrinėjami I. Kanto pozicijos konceptualūs pagrindai. Laikomasi nuomonės, kad mąstytojo prieštaravimas tarp moralinės revoliucijos ir politinės reformos yra dvilypės – noumenalios ir fenomenalios – dorybės pagrindas, kuri savo ruožtu paaiškina I. Kanto brėžiamą priešpriešą tarp principinio ir imitacinio elgesio švietime. Ginamas politinės reformos ir moralinės revoliucijos vaidmuo I. Kanto kultūrinės pažangos sampratoje.

**Raktažodžiai:** moralinis pakeitimas, dorybė, kultūrinė pažanga, *habitus libertatis*, etinė bendruomenė