

Two Theories of Names: How Mill's Semantics Superseded Teachings of Schoolmen

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Theory of names is a prominent part of analytic philosophy of language. Contemporary analysis of names is typically taken to be emerging from the works of F. Brentano, A. Meinong and especially G. Frege. However, the contemporary theory of names originates from J. S. Mill. *System of Logic*, his *opus magnum*, had an enormous influence on later development of logic, the philosophy of language and the emergence of logical positivism. The philosophy of language and the theory of names in the scholastic tradition were treated highly, partially to their significance to theology. However, achievements of the scholastic philosophy of language are hardly noticeable in the contemporary analytic philosophy of language. This article seeks to investigate the causes of such situation. These may involve disregard towards scholastic philosophy in general characteristic of the philosophy of Enlightenment. It is claimed that some other significant influence may had been the analysis of logic and epistemology provided in the *System of Logic*.

Keywords: analogy, meaning, names, reference, subsistence

INTRODUCTION

Theory of names is a widely discussed topic in the analytic philosophy of language which faced strong development. The beginning of modern treatment can be found in the philosophy of G. Frege (Frege 2001: 19–31), who investigated the cognitive content of sentences. The content of sentence, or *the thought* (*Gedanke*), is what determines the truth-value of the sentence. However, to distinguish one thought from another it is not enough to analyse corresponding truth-values, which according to Frege is what sentences refer to. Thus every sentence has two levels of content: its meaning (*Gedanke*, or *Sinn*) and its reference (*Bedeutung*). Parts of sentences can be analysed in a similar fashion: the meaning of a sentence depends not only on the references of the constituent proper names, but also on their meanings. Proper names thus refer to the object designated by the name; their meaning is the way their designation is provided. Another approach can be found in “On Denoting” (Russell 2001: 32–41), a famous article written by B. Russell, where he offers the logical analysis of definite descriptions into quantifiers and predicates: e.g. the sentence “The present King of France is bald” is logically

analysed as “there is one and only one entity which satisfies *being the present King of France and being bald*”, or more specifically, “there is such x which satisfies *being the present King of France and being bald* and if there is any y , which also satisfies before the mentioned predicates, then $y = x$ ”. Yet another analysis is proposed by J. Searle (Searle 1958: 166–173). According to him, the meaning of a proper name is provided by the characteristic bundle of descriptions, which is partially shared by every competent user of a language. The meaning of some particular proper name, e.g. *Aristotle*, is grasped by anyone who grasps some significant part of the associated description-bundle. Similar is the view of Wittgenstein, famously presented as the theory of family resemblances in his *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1986). The bundle theory, as well as other descriptivist theories of proper names are criticized by S. A. Kripke in his lectures “Naming and Necessity”. His argument is based on the principle of interchangeability within modal contexts. The linguistic expressions a_1 and a_2 are taken to have the same meaning if they can be mutually interchanged within modal contexts, in particular, sentences of the form “it is necessary that ...”. For example, the sentence “It is necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle” is true, but the sentence “It is necessary that Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great” is false. It is apparent that the test lets us reject the variety of description candidates, leading us to reject the whole bundle and thus the bundle theory itself. As an alternative treatment, Kripke proposes the so-called causal theory of names, according to which the referent of the name is determined by uncovering the underlying chain of certain utterances of the name, leading to the initial baptism (Kripke 1972: 37).

This short paragraph gives a rough picture of the general line of discourse regarding proper names in the analytic philosophy of language. The subject, being analysed by the most prominent names in the analytic tradition, proves to be at the core of contemporary investigation. However, I will argue that it was a highly discussed topic in the medieval schools of philosophy. I will also provide a possible answer to the question why these classical treatments of the problems regarding proper names are almost universally ignored.

DISTINCT FEATURES OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF NAMES

Theory of names (*nomines*) had attracted a significant attention during in the scholastic period of the Middle Ages. The question that begs the answer can be introduced by the famous paraphrasis of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas: “Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses” (Latin: “*Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu*”) (Thomas Aquinas 1952: Q2 a.3 arg.19). For it seems that only the sentences that describe sensory data have the content. However, sentences expressing truths of sciences generally put claims beyond sense-experience involving abstract entities. It naturally raises questions about the possibility of true reasoning concerning such claims. E.g. it is not clear why we can expect truth or falsity in the sentences where copula “is” connects two abstract terms. This, however, concerns not only the status of metaphysics as a science (for Aristotle, and for the majority of the theories facing his influence, science is an activity which gives necessary and general conclusions, the main branches being physics, geometry and metaphysics (Aristotle 1995: 1620)) but also the nature of scientific claims in general. This leads us to the first problem: how is it possible to attain a genuine knowledge regarding the abstract?

Another widely discussed topic of the Middle Ages was the question of knowledge of spiritual entities and God in particular. It involves such questions as: Can we use names (*nomines*) for God? Do any of the words we use for God express what He essentially is? Do some of the words we use for God apply to him literally, or are they all metaphorical? Are

words used of God and creatures univocally or equivocally? Can we make affirmative statements about God? (Aquinas 2008: 215). The problem can be reduced to the question: can we have any true knowledge of God or spiritual entities?

Classical philosophy answers these questions positively by showing that our language is flexible and universal enough to express the most difficult contents; it does not limit the scope of our knowledge. To support such claim, one must understand how do words operate in natural language, and this involves providing the theory of meaning. The core of such theory rested on the Aristotelian view that names (*nomines*) are “signs of ideas, and ideas the similitudes of things. So it is evident that names function in the signification of things though the conception of the intellect. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it” (Thomas Aquinas 1945: 113). Just say the name *man* expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition which manifests his essence. For the meaning of a word is our mental conception of the thing meant. A similar line of thought is also apparent in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “the definition rests on the necessity of <...> meaning something; for the formula, of which the word is a sign, becomes its definition” (Aristotle 1995: 1598). We have a tripartite structure: word *signifies the* idea, which in turn *signifies* the object. Such structure is typical of classical philosophy and is essential for understanding the way words function.

In analysing significations of names, it is important to distinguish between abstract and concrete names. According to classical treatment, a concrete name expresses a composite subsisting entity. An abstract name expresses a non-composite entity and cannot express subsistence. According to Thomas Aquinas, “In material creatures what is perfect and subsistent is composite, whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is, hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning, as befits composite things. On the other hand, names given to signify simple forms signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And since God is simple and subsisting, we attribute to Him simple and abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete name to signify His subsistence and perfection” (Thomas Aquinas 1945: 113).

Names can be used synonymously. It is important to emphasize that synonymous names signify one thing under one aspect; for names which signify different aspects of one thing do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing, because a name signifies a thing only thought as the medium of the intellectual conception.

Names can be used both univocally and equivocally. It may seem that all names that are not univocal are equivocal: it should be granted by the law of excluded middle. However, this is not the case. For according to Thomas Aquinas, “Although in predications all equivocals must be reduced to univocal, still in actions the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as the sun is the cause of the generation of all men. But the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by the way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not a univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, while not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal (otherwise it could not produce its own likeness); but it can be called an analogical agent, just as in predications all univocal names are reduced to one first non univocal analogical name, which is being” (Aquinas 2008: 225–226).

So in between univocal and equivocal names there are also analogical names. The analogy in question is the analogy by (or the proportion of) the being, which is usually employed to analyse metaphysical notions, thus, *substance*_{p,m}: *being*_{p,m}; *quantity*: *being*_{s,m} = *quality*: *being*_{s,m1}. Here *p,m* stands for *primary meaning*, and both *s,m* and *s,m1* stand for secondary meanings.

Another kind of analogy is analogy by (or proportion of) the end. In relevant cases, the name used analogically is predicated of many whose natures are diverse but which are attributed to one same thing, as health is said of the animal body, or urine and food, but it does not signify entirely the same thing in all three; it is said of urine as a sign of health, of body as of a subject and of food as of a cause. But all these natures are attributed to one end, namely, to health (Thomas Aquinas 2005: c6, 46).

The third type of analogy is analogy by action. Sometimes those things which agree according to analogy, i.e. in proportion, comparison or agreement, are attributed to one end, as was plain in the preceding example of health. Sometimes they are attributed to one end, as was plain in the preceding example of health. Sometimes they are attributed to one agent, as medical is said of one who acts with art, of one who acts without art, as a midwife, and even of the instruments; but it is said of all by attribution to one agent which is medicine (Thomas Aquinas 2005: c6, 47).

The medieval treatment of names was largely extended within the framework of *grammatica speculative*, which was developed during 13th and 14th ages. The treatment begins with the observation that names have their meanings only within the context of sentences. Only sentences have truth values. The object of grammar cannot be combinations of sounds or characters; so the creators of *grammatica speculative*, so-called Modists, were interested in the generalized objects of speech acts: types of words and their constructs. According to the modistic analysis, words consist of a phonological element (*vox*) and two levels of semantic components, one concerned with specific or lexical meanings (*significate specialia*), the other with more general meanings, called *modi significandi*, on which in turn the syntactical component depends. At first, the expression is connected with a referent, insofar as a name is instituted to refer to a definite object or an attribute of an object.

In a secondary imposition, the lexeme receives a number of *modi significandi* which determine the grammatical categories of the word. The same ending can express more than one mode. For example, the Latin ending *us* represents the nominative case, singular number, and masculine gender. Lexeme can also be related to various modes, e.g. *to hate* (verb), *hatred* (noun), *behated* (participle). The generalized Modists taxonomy on the modes of names would involve the distinction between general modes (*modus generalis*) which is common to several parts of speech, and a specific mode (*modus specificus*) which defines one and only one part of speech. The general scheme of modes could be represented in the following manner:

- I. + stability (*modus habitus et quietis or modus substantiae*).
1. + definite reference, noun (*substantival and adjectival*);
2. – definite reference (*modus indeterminatae apprehensionis*), pronoun.
- II. + change (*modus fluxus et fieri*).
3. + predicability or separability (*modus distantis*), verb;
4. – predicability or separability (*modus indistantis*), participle.
- III. + modification (*modus disponentis*).
5. – act-determinant (*modus determinants actum*), adverb;
6. + referring object to an act (*modus retorquendi substantiam ad actum*), preposition;

- 7. + uniting (*modus uniendi*), conjunction;
- 8. + emotionally affecting the mind (*modus afficientis animam*), interjection.

Roman numerals here signify *modus generalis*, and Arabic ones signify *modus specificus* (Pinborg 1982: 258). The semantic status of the *modi significandi* was described within a triadic system: the *modi significandi* correspond to *modi intelligendi*, which in turn correspond to *modi essendi*. The *modi essendi* are accidental properties of the objects, as distinct from their substantial forms. It is, however, such properties which give rise to our concepts. The Modists agreed with Aquinas in assuming that we can attain knowledge even of the essence of objects through their accidental properties.

The semantic theory of Modists belongs to the type of semantic theories which are more concerned not with the reference, but with the meaning. The difference between the reference and the meaning was described as the difference between the *formal* and the *material* meaning. The formal meaning contains everything that belongs to the name by its *ratio significandi* (the relation holding between the expression and the object referred to) and *modi significandi*. The material meaning also covers the denoted or implied referents (it constitutes its passive aspect), and, unlike the formal meaning, introduces questions of applicability, and, in propositional contexts, of truth and falsity (Pinborg 1982: 264). The accurate reconstruction of the speculative grammar is, however, not within the scope of this article. It is only to be emphasized that the philosophical investigations of language during the Medieval Era were not by any means shallow or inferior in their depth to contemporary ones. Why then did they face no continuation, disputes or modifications within the course of the analytic philosophy of 20th century? I claim that it was partially caused by the overwhelming popularity of Mill's *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*, which provided an authentic and distinct version of the theory of names leading to what was taken to be the "classical" treatment of contemporary philosophers.

MILL'S THEORY OF NAMES

Mill begins his chapter *On Names* (Mill 1981: 24–46) by citing not Thomas Aquinas or Thomas of Erfurt (which would be natural) but Hobbes: "A name", says Hobbes, "is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had before in his mind" (Mill 1981: 24). Mill thus does not mention the classical tripartite analysis of names, according to which, as was already said, names refer to objects by virtue of mental contents, and this in turn allows us to name something as much as our understanding of such thing comprehends. Mill argues against Hobbes by claiming that names are names of things rather than ideas. The argument creates the illusion of two alternatives: name either signifies the idea or the thing. The first is then reasonably criticized. Names, according to Mill, therefore, shall always be spoken as the names of things themselves, and not merely of our ideas of things. But the question then arises, of what things? This leads Mill to consider various types of names.

Discussing different types of names Mill mentions grammatical investigations of the scholastic philosophy, but his concerns entail only the categorematic/syncategorematic distinction. Syncategorematic terms, according to Mill, are words, which can be used only together with other words, while categorematic terms can be used either as the subject or predicate of a proposition without being accompanied by any other word.

Mill later offers his own categorization of names, but he does not provide grounds for such a categorization. It is rather to be taken as obvious and self-sufficient. The first distinction of names is between general and singular names. A general name is a name which is capable

of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of things. General names are to be distinguished from collective names: "It is necessary to distinguish general names from collective names. A general name is one which can be predicated of each individual of a multitude; a collective name cannot be predicated of each separately, but only of all taken together. "The 76th regiment of foot in the British army", which is a collective name, is not a general but an individual name" (Mill 1981: 228).

The second general division of names is into concrete and abstract ones. A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing. The distinction between concrete and abstract names was well-known amongst the Scholars; this was mentioned before, while discussing quotes from Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologica*, I, Q. 13, a.1, Reply to Obj. 2). It is to be noticed that according to Aquinas, a concrete name signifies a composite subsistent object (in regard of matter and form), while an abstract name signifies a composite, but non-subsistent object. In his definition Mill argues against Thomas Aquinas: they even use the same means of explanation since both analyse the word "whiteness".

The third distinction of names is between connotative and non-connotative, or absolute, names. Mill writes: "this is one of the most important distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out, and one of those which go deepest into the nature of language" (Mill 1981: 31). Mill also provides a unique analysis of the term "connotative". According to him, "A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute. Anything that possesses attributes is here meant as a subject. Thus John or London, or England, are names which signify a subject only. Whiteness, length and virtue signify an attribute only. None of these names, therefore, are connotative. But white, long and virtuous are connotative. The word *white* denotes all white things, such as snow, paper and the foam of the sea (Mill 1981: 31). To put it simply, to connotate means to imply attributes [of the object signified], while to denote means to signify [an object]. All concrete general names, following Mill, are connotative: that is why they can be general, that is, to signify different objects by providing their common attributes. Proper names, however, are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes belonging to those individuals. But there is another kind of names, which, although they are individual, that is, predicable only of one object, are in fact connotative. Such names are *Sun*, *God*, etc. These names, strictly speaking, are general rather than individual names: for, however, they may be in fact predicable only of one object, there is nothing in their meaning which implies this. They are connotative by the very fact that they have meaning, which allows their separation from proper names, which, by definition, are non-connotative, that is, lacking meaning.

The fourth distinction on Mill's proposal is between positive and negative names. They do not pose any bigger threat in a sense of the difficulties of analysis, only a possible exception being the so-called *privative* names (derived from Latin *privatio*). We find the following fragment: "There is a class of names called privative. A privative name is equivalent in its signification to a positive and a negative name taken together; being the name of something which has once had a particular attribute, or for some other reason might have been expected to have it, but which has it not. Such is the word *blind*, which is not equivalent to not seeing, or to not capable of seeing, for it would not, except by a poetical or rhetorical figure, be applied to stocks and stones <...>. The names called privative, therefore, connote two things; the absence of certain attributes, and the presence of others, from which the presence also of

the former might naturally have been expected” (Mill 1981: 42). Here Mill opposes Aquinas once again, by providing in fact a simpler and shallower interpretation. According to Aquinas, “We should know that, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says in Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, something is said to be a being [*ens per se*] in two different senses: in one sense, [only] those things [are called beings] that are sorted into the ten categories; in the other sense [calling something a being] signifies the truth of a proposition. And the difference between the two is that in the second sense everything can be said to be a being of which a [true] affirmative proposition can be formed, even if it posits nothing in reality; it is in this way that privations and negations are said to be beings, for we say that an affirmation is the opposite of negation, and that there is blindness in an eye. But in the first sense only that can be said to be a being which posits something in reality. Therefore, blindness and the like are not beings in the first sense. So, the name “essence” [*essentia*] is not derived from “being” [*ens*] in the second sense (for some things are said to be beings in this sense although they do not have an essence, as is clear in the case of privations), but from “being” as it is used in the first sense” (Thomas Aquinas 2006: ch1). Privation for Aquinas is something which comes to being not from itself, that is, is not being *per se*. It is always to be defined through its relation to the form and it is to be seen as purely accidental [*per accidens*]. Here Thomas Aquinas gives the following explanation for the accidental being of the privation. The doctor, who is building a house, builds it not as a doctor, but as a house builder, which happens to be a doctor. The emergence of a house builder from a doctor is to be seen as an emergence of the accidental. Privation, however, can be attributed only to a defined object, in which an attribute, opposite to the attributes which are to be found in the nature of the object, is, by the same nature, possible to emerge. For example, only these can be blind which by their nature can see. Here Mill is to be seen as once again simplifying the underlying background of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, in which matter, form and deficiency are to be seen as three basic constituents of being.

The fifth division of names provided by Mill is into relative and absolute, or, rather, relative and non-relative ones. According to Mill, “Relative names are such as father, son; ruler; subject; like; equal; unlike; unequal; longer, shorter; cause, effect. Their characteristic property is that they are always given in pairs. Every relative name which is predicated of an object, supposes another object (or objects), of which we may predicate either that same name or another relative name which is said to be the correlative of the former. Thus, when we call any person a son, we suppose other persons who must be called parents” (Mill 1981: 42).

The sixth and final distinction that Mill offers is between univocal and equivocal names. This is also a distinction which was well-known in the scholastic philosophy of language, which is typically supplemented with the names used by analogy. This is curiously noted by Mill. However, according to him, the analogical usage of names is to be seen as the metaphorical use, and, on his opinion, is the main source of a wide range of flaws: “An intermediate case is that of a name used analogically or metaphorically; that is, a name which is predicated of two things, not univocally, or exactly in the same signification, but in significations somewhat similar, and which being derived one from the other, one of them may be considered the primary, and the other a secondary signification. As when we speak of a brilliant light and a brilliant achievement. The word is not applied in the same sense to the light and to the achievement; but having been applied to the light in its original sense, that of brightness to the eye, it is transferred to the achievement in a derivative signification, supposed to be somewhat like the primitive one. The word, however, is just as properly two names instead of one, in this case, as in that of the most perfect ambiguity. And one of the commonest forms of

fallacious reasoning arising from ambiguity, is that of arguing from a metaphorical expression as if it were literal“ (Mill 1981: 45).

Scholastic tradition, however, made a strict distinction between the metaphorical and analogical use of names. The metaphor and the analogy are both to be seen as proportion. It is, however, constituted not by being, but by the mode of action. For example, we can express the following analogy by the proportion: *man : being = plant : being*; however, in the metaphor we give the proportion in a different way: *king : ruler of men = lion : ruler of beasts*. The metaphor is grounded on a distant resemblance of two entities. The common name is to be predicated only to the first entity, while to the second it can be predicated only by connoting the first one basing such predication on the distant resemblance in question. If we surrender the use of analogy, we risk of losing lots of notions which are unavoidable in sciences. For example, the notions of *current*, *field*, *spin* and variety of other notions in physics are analogical.

INFLUENCE OF MILL'S THEORY TOWARDS MODERN APPROACHES

The history of modern approaches in the analysis of names arguably starts with the German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege. In his famous article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege criticises Mill's theory by arguing that proper names must have sense for otherwise some intuitively true and non-trivial identity statements could not be both true and informative. Mill's view is taken to be a standard one; the scholastic theory is not mentioned. This is, however, not mysterious given that “System of Logic” became one of the core philosophical texts in the German logical tradition after the publication of Schiel's translation in 1849. However, the German logical thought was also shaped by Mill's contemporary Bernard Bolzano, who, being a catholic priest and a theologian, was well acquainted with the main philosophical texts in the tradition of Schoolmen (i.e. as noticed by Künne (2014: 421–423), Bolzano in his analysis of logical paradoxes quotes Savonarola's “Compendium Logicae” as the authority in the subject). Frege's views, being in fact closer to these of Bolzano and in turn more similar to the Scholastic way of thinking, were naturally contrary to those of Mill. (There is another question whether, and in what depth, was Frege acquainted with Bolzano's writings. Sundholm (1999) thinks that Frege did not read Bolzano at the time of writing “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”; however, he finds some close resemblance in their views.)

Another influential step towards the modern theory is one taken by Russell, who analysed common proper names as abbreviated definite descriptions. He was, however, familiar with both the Mill's logic (as a matter of fact, Mill was Russell's godfather) and the German school of thought, in particular with the writings of Frege. The debate on names then escalated with a bunch of celebrated articles mentioned in the introduction. Deviation from Mill's ideas is brought back by Saul Kripke.

CONCLUSIONS

By evaluating the Mill's proposed interpretation of names, we see that Mill was well acquainted with the scholastic theory of names, for which, however, he held no warm feelings. It is apparent not only in the similarity of discussed aspects, but also in the usage of corresponding examples, like the analysis of words *whiteness* or *blindness*.

In his own theory of names Mill occasionally mentions the scholastic theory of names; he, however, does not debate it and most of the time simply ignores its arguments. His choice of opponents, such as Hobbes in his critique of analysis of the signification of names rather than the tripartite theory of scholastic philosophy, proves his unwillingness to straightforwardly

oppose the scholastic philosophy of language. Such unwillingness also entails his disregard towards *grammatica speculativa*, which is not mentioned altogether.

Mill is in particular unfavourable to the scholastic theory of analogy, by equating the metaphor with the analogy and claiming that an analogical way of speaking can provide us with nothing better than flaws and ambiguities. Metaphors, in Mill's view, can justly be used by poets and writers, but not by creators of scientific theories. The analogy and the metaphor are, in fact, not to be equated. Their differences are, however, ignored in Mill's theory.

Mill does not try to ground his view on the basis of solid arguments or extensive critique of important schools of thought, such as the works of the Scholastics. His way of putting down his theory is by appeal to one's common sense, clarity and supposed obviousness of proposed claims. Mill also appeals to reader's sophistication, by paraphrasing common motives in classical accounts of the philosophy of language by trying to convince one that what he states is something more or less established. Competing positions are, however, not analysed in any details. This, in my view, resulted in exactly what Mill hoped to achieve.

The theory of names in the contemporary analytic philosophy was consequently shaped by Mill's ideas: the modern debate starts with Mill and not one of the core texts in the field analyses or at least presents the ideas of Schoolmen.

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Dvi vardų teorijos: kaip J. S. Millio semantika pakeitė scholastų mokymus

Santrauka

Vardų teorija užima reikšmingą vietą analitinėje kalbos filosofijoje. Jos pradžia paprastai siejama su F. Brentano, A. Meinongo, o ypač su G. Frege's darbiais. Tačiau šiuolaikinės vardų teorijos pradininku reiktų laikyti J. S. Millį, kurio „Logikos sistema“ buvo labai svarbi tiek logikos, tiek loginio pozityvizmo, tiek analitinės kalbos filosofijos raidai. Kalbos filosofija ir vardų teorija scholastinėje tradicijoje sulaukė išskirtinio dėmesio ypač dėl to, kad jos pasiekimais rėmėsi teologija. Buvo išplėtota tiek semantinė kalbos teorija, tiek spekuliatyvioji gramatika. Tačiau scholastinės kalbos filosofijos pasiekimai niekaip neatsispindi šiuolaikinėje analitinėje kalbos filosofijoje. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama atsakyti, kodėl taip atsitiko. Galbūt tam įtakos turėjo ne tik atsainus švietimo filosofijos atstovų požiūris į scholastinę filosofiją (jis čia nenagrinėjamas), bet ir J. S. Millio garsiausiame veikalė „Logikos sistema“ pateikta išsami visos logikos ir pažinimo teorijos analizė. Šis veikalas turi labai aiškią ir paprastą struktūrą, parašytas sklandžia kalba ir labiau remiasi apeliacija į sveiką protą nei į subtilius samprotavimus. J. S. Millis buvo gerai susipažinęs su scholastine kalbos filosofija, tačiau ja nesirėmė ir atvirai jos nekritikavo. Vardų teorija šiuolaikinėje analitinėje filosofijoje buvo rengiama remiantis J. S. Millio idėjomis: polemika prasideda autoriaus idėjų kritika, o scholastinės teorijos nenagrinėja nei vieno iš pagrindiniais laikomų tekstų.

Raktažodžiai: analogija, reikšmė, nurodymas, subsistencija, vardai