Philosophical and Social Foundations of European Political Identity in Crisis Against the Background of the New Stage of European Integration

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The article is dedicated to the problems of European political identity and European identity as a whole conception and as a foundation for European integration. Before 24 February 2022, European political identity had been in crisis. The contradictions between the EU member states seemed to be hardly resolvable. The Russian aggression against Ukraine gave a strong impetus to the formation of European identity. However, it is still a negative incentive for unity and solidarity rather than cohesion around positive values, as well as from the outset the European integration was caused by devastating World War II as a negative experience, which should never be repeated. The text makes use of methods peculiar to the philosophical sciences, i.e. critical textual analysis, historical-analytical and comparative methods.

Keywords: philosophy of culture, philosophy of politics, philosophy of modernity, Europe of nations, European identity, European integration, European political institutions, interculturalism

INTRODUCTION

The concept of ‘European identity’ is the cornerstone for the process of European integration and political unity of the member states of the European Union. ‘European identity is necessary for the European Union to avoid fragmentation, chaos and conflicts of all kinds and to promote unity, solidarity, subsidiarity, harmony and cooperation’ (Delgado-Moreira 2018: 83–92). However, the concept of European identity still remains extremely amorphous and debatable.

The philosophical discussion of freedom is central to social and political life. Bergson said of freedom that it is to the modern era what Zeno’s paradoxes were to the Eleates. Accordingly, philosophical conceptions of freedom can be divided into those that treat freedom
as a value – a gift and privilege for which man should strive, and those for which freedom is a burden attached to man's existence.

Sartre was one of those philosophers who, like Kant or Nietzsche, realised with full clarity the fact of man’s detachment from objective reality, his incompatibility with things existing outside of himself, while attempting to draw definitive consequences from this fact. This incompatibility can be expressed by saying that not only are we unable to be sure whether our ideas, judgments and theories are in some way compatible with objective reality, but we can even say what this compatibility would consist in. And since our choices are free (in the traditional sense of the word) if they have a certain content, i.e. are choices of certain values and goals, so our understanding of human freedom obviously depends on whether we are able to relate to anything outside our own minds.

Unlike existentialism, however, postmodernism does not treat the freedom gained through the rejection of objectivity as a source of trepidation, but as true and complete freedom. As R. Rorty notes, instead of asking how things really are and what criteria of cognition we have at our disposal, we should rather ask what communities we should identify with, what communities we should consider ourselves members of. Thus, the area of the realisation of human freedom ceases to be objective reality, and becomes a community, membership in which the individual also declares by free decision.

For A. Fossard, the essence of freedom is the ability to turn against one’s own nature. The error of determinism is the belief that man’s freedom consists in creating himself, in the fact that man never depends on anyone. <...> Meanwhile, freedom is not that which allows man in all circumstances to affirm himself, but the other way around: that which, on occasion, makes him deny himself out of love or generosity. By throwing the notion of nature outside the realm of philosophical discussion, we eliminate the basis on which our understanding of freedom was supported. While freedom is not directly challenged, it disappears from philosophical reflection along with the concepts of objectivity and truth.

Those examples, however, clearly indicate that identity is a result of several forces and choices, some of which are purely subjective and contractual.

**EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY IN CRISIS – PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE**

With each new step in the process of creating common European political public institutions, it was becoming clear that the European identity could not become predominant in the single European space as a result of successful economic, financial and political integration. In other words, from the mechanical merging of national economies, the erasure of borders, freedom of trade and movement, there is no identity as a common self-consciousness of hundreds of millions of Europeans.

European society should be understood as an organised and unified whole with an effort to contribute to solving the problem of its unified, evaluative functional interconnection (Bochin, Polačko 2021). On the other hand, Europe also suffers from disintegration and a lower degree of social cohesion (Dancák 2011). In fact, the main obstacle to the formation of a common identity is the national identity of the European nations (Ovcharenko, Semenenko 2022). The concept of ‘union of national identities’ as the basis for the European Union could overcome these obstacles. It was on the basis of such concepts that the concept of ‘inter-culturalism’ arose, which was supposed to replace ‘multiculturalism’ (Taylor 2012: 413–423).

But the ‘union of identities’ implies either the initial closeness of these identities to each other, or their convergence under the influence of powerful external and internal factors.
Issues of a common European identity have acquired a particular relevance in the context of the all-out war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The starting point for the conflict was the overthrow of the pro-Russian President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 as a result of the mass protests by Ukrainians caused by the decision not to sign the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine by Yanukovych. The revolutionary change of political power in Ukraine was called Euromaidan. Their main slogans were the statement 'Україна – це Європа!' (‘Ukraine is Europe’) and ‘the Ukrainians are Europeans’, that is, the protesting Ukrainians’ short declaration of their European identity.

As a result of political changes, Ukraine declares leaning towards the European understanding of tolerance, whose principles were already successfully implemented in Ukrainian national educational programs (Medvid et al. 2021). Nonetheless, the implementation of new trends in Ukrainian education was first slowed down with the Covid crisis (Khan et al. 2021) and later in the cause of war conflict (Trubavina et al. 2021).

Russian Federation’s invasion, which actually began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbass, was not caused by primordial hostility to everything European, since the Russian political and business elite in the 1990s and early 2000s themselves sought the Europeanisation of Russia. The Russian elite, including Vladimir Putin’s closest friends, bought luxurious old mansions and vineyards in Europe, opened accounts in European banks, paid for the education of their children in the best European universities, and tried to follow the European fashion.

The Russian authoritarian regime saw the European choice of Ukrainians as a threat to its hegemonic plans. Two East Slavic Eastern Christian Orthodox nations, close to each other in their historical origin, language and culture, were involved in a bloody armed conflict. At the same time, both nations consider themselves European to varying degrees.

For Ukrainians, who are ready to offer armed resistance to the superior forces of the aggressor, Europe is not a special culture or civilisation, but, above all, a certain set of values and norms. Relatively speaking, the border of European identity does not pass between cultures and ethnic groups, but has an axiological nature. The war in Ukraine sharply aggravated the discussion about the European identity. Thousands of people cannot die for something illusory that does not exist in the reality.

The European choice of Ukrainians is interpreted in different ways, but inevitably implies some real values. Now it is still difficult to understand what Ukrainians mean by the European identity and what values they are ready to fight for. Even the value of freedom is perceived in Ukraine in a completely different way compared to that of the Western European countries. But there is no doubt that the motives for their heroic resistance to the invaders must be very strong.

Thus, the question of European identity is one of the main ones in the discourse on the European Union. On the one hand, there is a clear contradiction between the theoretical description of this phenomenon and its attempts to implement it in practice. On the other hand, the discourse of European identity is too multidirectional and, as a result, it is understood in Europe quite differently.

There are completely different historical, political, social and normative perceptions of the European identity, so we must recognise the existence of different contexts, theoretical foundations and political realities of the use of this concept. It seems to be a well-founded opinion that ‘European identity has never been a single concept’ (Karolewski, Kaina 2006: 19).
Most importantly, no plan has been drafted for its development in the context of European integration. Pro-European politicians and technocrats such as Robert Schuman, who pioneered the concept of European integration, hinted that the process of integration and the creation of a new Europe would be a long, gradual undertaking. A united Europe will not be built all at once in accordance with a single comprehensive plan. Most likely, this will happen gradually, through a series of concrete results, each of which will create solidarity (White 2010). The definition of “European identity” is used in many contexts and in various studies, with the result that the meaning of this term has become so blurred that it has completely lost its strict analytical precision (Madeker 2006). The concepts of European identity, actively developed since the announcement of the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ in 1973 (Declaration on European Identity 1973), were built mainly around the conceiving of ‘we’, which was supposed to be shared by everyone who is defined as a European, and then the Old Europe declaratively fixed this concept.

In fact, the understanding of what constitutes the European identity has centred around a formed image that captures some ideal concept of building a united Europe. Moreover, the concept of European identity was initially based on an unresolved question: Who are ‘we’? This means that the entire subsequent discourse of European identity is based on the notion of some ‘imaginary community’, and it is possible that this ‘we’ does not exist in the reality. An identity like ‘we are Europeans’ can also be given another interpretation – as a community that lays European values as the basis of its existence: inviolable and inalienable human rights, free market economy, protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of self-determination, democratic political system and ethnoculturalism. But in this case, the borders of Europe will turn out to be excessively wide and blurred, since these values today are not only European, but some of them were adopted outside the European Union before they were developed in Europe itself. ‘Liberalism emerges as a normative tradition of American identity, as a creed, and ethnoculturalism, although less celebrated than liberalism, has also been a defining element of American identity’ (Schildkraut 2007: 612). The values of personal freedom, human rights, free market economy, and other liberal values underlie not only the American identity, but also some Asian ones, such as Japan. In addition, it is worth recognising that the free market, democracy, civil rights and freedoms have not always been at the forefront of European politics and culture. Until the middle of the 20th century, most political regimes in Europe remained non-democratic, and democracy was criticised by many European thinkers.

Historically, the emergence of European identity as an instrument of integration is an attempt to protect Europe from its gloomy past; it was in this defensive form that the discourse around the concept of ‘Europe’ was built. ‘Which past will be on the pedestal? Or if we take the stand as analysts, which side of European roots do we study as influencing most the present strategy of the European Union? We might correctly answer warfare and genocide. The European consciousness is so concerned about escaping from these events that any form of racism or nationalism is now called neonazism. However well meaning, this categorization fosters the impression that racism and genocide were invented in Europe in the twentieth century. Muslims, Jews, Basques, and Scots, among others, know better’ (Delgado-Moreira 2018). On the other hand, cultures can live together only if they are not mutually incommensurable (Dupkala, Ambrozy 2022).

In the reality, the historical roots of European identity look rather weak. Europe has never in its history been a model of unity, as evidenced by the Eurosceptic assessment of European integration into a genuine political union. Whatever united Europe in the Middle
Ages cannot become a unifying principle in contemporary conditions. 'To the extent that we wish to speak of a common European historical destiny we would find that there are more competition, rivalry, strife, war and other forms of non-co-operative behavior than forms of co-operative behavior… In this sense it seems inappropriate to speak of the long-term historical origins of a European identity, which – according to both Webster, Le Petit Robert and the psychoanalytical definition – would have to denote a form of sameness' (Bryder 2005: 43–44). Therefore, it seems inappropriate to talk about the long-term historical origins of European identity.

Some researchers in the area of identity point out that 'America', 'Asia' and 'Europe' exist only in discourse and 'what we call European, American or Asian identity is a product of discourse' (Sassatelli 2015). It follows that the construction of identity will depend on the context in which the concepts of 'Europe' or 'America' are used.

The concept of 'European identity' contains uncertainty. 'The main uncertainty lies in the idea of 'Europe'. The phenomenon of Europe does not have clear spatial and temporal characteristics. Indeed, the history of Europe since the thirteenth century has been one of expansion from its center. So in a sense “Europe” exists where “Europeans” have succeeded in rooting themselves and their institutions, anywhere in the world' (White 2000). Therefore, the European identity is not something localised by political borders or the borders of the European area or the Schengen area. 'European' may exist outside of Europe as a geographical continent. But 'European' is not identical with the concept of 'European identity'. European customs and traditions are rapidly spreading around the world and are becoming common in many Asian, African and American countries. But it is hardly possible to consider these countries European only on the basis of their external appearance.

The architecture of European identity is built on institutional principles. As can be seen already from the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ (1973), it is the institutional meanings that politically separate Europe from the rest of the world. This is one of the key meanings of European identity, it is the institutionalisation of identity that becomes a tool for the formation of a single whole from Europe, securing subjectivity for it.

In the Middle Ages and Modern times, ‘Europe’ coincided with the territorial limits of the spread of Western Christianity, excluding the Balkan Peninsula, with Eastern Christianity prevailing there. At present, ‘Europe’ is a much broader concept. Charles de Gaulle put forward the slogan ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’, meaning the expansion of a single space of security and European culture to the geographical borders of Europe. Russian and some European politicians in the 1990s and early 2000s talked seriously about ‘Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. At the same time, Russian politicians had in mind economic integration, the creation of a single economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, since culturally they considered themselves an inseparable part of European civilisation.

The well-known Ukrainian historian and statesman Mikhailo Grushevski believed that the eastern border of Europe runs along the border between Ukraine and Russia. Such judgments in 1918 seemed unfounded by nationalist propaganda claims. However, at present, this opinion is becoming more plausible. In any case, the issue of a common cultural and civilisational space in Europe remains highly debatable. It should also be remembered that for many centuries Ukraine was an integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which belonged to the European political and cultural sense of this notion.

The transformation of the concepts of European identity is becoming more and more obvious, in which the discourse of the cultural unity of Europe is giving way to a discourse
related to the real challenges and threats facing the European Union. The cultural unity of Europe does not exist in the reality. This imaginary concept seems to smooth out the cultural heterogeneity of individual European countries and regions. Even the idea of Christianity and common traditional religious and spiritual values cannot serve as the main key conception of European identity, as the European Union is seen less and less as a ‘Christian club’ (Madeker 2006), even in countries such as Germany or Italy, known for their Christian traditions.

‘Promoters of political identity argue that the common cultural foundation in Europe is too weak to stimulate the European to realize belonging to a community’ (Boukala, Boukala 2019). Indeed, ethno-cultural factors, such as languages, religions and nationalities, which are represented today in the EU space, are too diverse to become a starting point in the construction of a European identity. Rather, on the contrary, the ethno-cultural factor in the European Union performs the function of deconstructing unity, strengthening the national identities of the EU member states in the United Europe vs Europe of nations dichotomy. Attempts to build a ‘Europe of regions’ as opposed to a ‘Europe of nations’ have been unsuccessful. Regional identity in Europe has always been opposed to the national one, but the mechanical sum of regional identities does not transform into a single European identity.

As paradoxical as it may seem, the concept of a ‘Europe of regions’ goes back to the ideas promoted by Alain de Benoist about the European unity. Benoist’s ‘Europe of a Hundred Flags’ project became widely known in the 1980s. This project proposes the creation of a single European Empire, within which a broad freedom, the autonomy of ethnic groups and individual regions is envisaged. In his concept, A. de Benoist assigns a central place to regional or local self-government and local traditions. Similar to the concept of Evola, Benoist puts forward the idea of federalism and the Empire, since this form of organisation does not threaten the disappearance of the cultural diversity of Europe (de Benoist 1993).

The cultural foundations of Europe are somewhat abstract things not only ignored in the scientific community as a subject for research, but also not clear to the inhabitants of the European Union. It is quite obvious that in different national cultures there are a wide variety of ideas and conceptions regarding ‘European culture’. It should be taken into account that language and religion are fundamental cultural foundations for the construction of identity. Language in general is one of the main meaning-forming elements of identity, since it is through it that we acquire group understanding and through language we maintain contact with the outside world.

Indeed, the language problem is an insoluble problem of ‘European identity’ (Ammon 2006). It should be emphasised here that the level of English proficiency in different EU member states is very different. In the discourse of European identity, it is very often noted that ‘language cannot be easily used as a common denominator to create a common sense of European identity, but English may well act as a working language’ (Bryder 2005: 39). But this moment establishes the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition throughout the EU, which is contrary to the provision on the identity of states within the EU, written in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union: ‘The Union shall respect the national identity of its member states’ (The Treaty of Maastricht or the European Union, 1992). In addition, the Brexit called into question the status of the English language for the EU authorities. Proposals have been made to make German and/or French official and working languages of the European Union (de la Baume 2021). After the Brexit, English remains the national language only in Ireland – in a country that is significantly inferior in population to Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and many other European countries.
Therefore, the cultural concept of European identity is more like a device that is designed to cause psychological comfort, but is unacceptable in real integrative practices within the European Union. The strong cultural differentiation of Europe in general cast doubt on the reality of European identity, which was debatably expressed in such judgments, 'Is there such a thing as European identity?' (Papadogiannis 2019). The concept of European identity was severely undermined as a result of the European migration crisis, which peaked in 2015. The consequences of this crisis were open and public disagreements between the EU member states regarding the reception and distribution of refugees from Africa and Asia. At the same time, disagreements showed deep cultural differences between the countries. In addition, the question arose as to whether to consider immigrants as Europeans for their more successful social inclusion, or to recognise the inability of Europeans to integrate representatives of other cultures and thereby question the openness of European communities.

The political science discourse of European identity, as opposed to the cultural one, offers a different equation that describes the construction of a single European identity. 'Political identity better connects the people living in the EU countries. Although European cultures are indeed diverse, their unity in the European Union defines the European cultural concept' (Mayer, Palmowski 2004). This makes it possible to maintain national and regional traditions, since it makes it possible to combine cultural differences within the framework of common grounds. But the political integration of the EU has not yet taken place, and the EU has not become a full-fledged international actor, even at the level of foreign policy.

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the main political issue in the EU has not yet been resolved – the legitimacy of supranational structures and their connection with citizens of the EU member states, which strengthens the position of Eurosceptics. The departure from the ‘democracy deficit’ at the national levels has led to a new ‘democracy deficit’ in the supranational structures of the EU, since the supranational political institutions of Europe, with the exception of the European Parliament, are not legitimised by voting of its inhabitants. In many cases, democratic institutions at the national level work much more effectively than at the European Union level.

The European identity built on the principle of avoiding a ‘democratic deficit’ implies that the European Union must become a true supranational democracy. This process ‘requires structural changes aimed at changing the status of the EU as a “project in progress” to something more concrete and tangible’ (Valentini 2005).

The members of the European Commission, the main executive body of the EU, are appointed by national governments. The Council of the European Union continues to be an intergovernmental institution. Finally, the European Parliament, the only institution legitimised by suffrage, has so little power that its decisions and deliberations are largely ignored by public opinion. All these institutions are very far from the Europeans, who largely see them as a technocratic bureaucracy, and no more.

The turnout for the European Parliament elections remains rather low (Franklin 2014). The post-communist countries stand out, in particular, where the turnout does not exceed 35%. Abstention from participation in elections, in particular, reduces the legitimacy of the electoral process, the European Parliament and the European Union as a whole (Mahler et al. 2014: 363).

J. Habermas, a German philosopher and social theorist, who is considered to be the intellectual architect of European identity, in his new book ‘The Crisis of the European Union’ develops the idea that ‘a pan-European civic solidarity cannot arise if social inequality
between member states becomes a permanent structural feature of the EU and is a dividing line poor and rich countries’ (Habermas 2012: 14). The German philosopher also notes the noticeable features of the institutional crisis within the EU, pointing out that an asymmetry has actually arisen between the EU institutions, monopolised by the political elite, and the democratic participation of the people in the Brussels processes. ‘Today we can see’, notes Habermas, ‘the indifference and even apathy of the citizens of the union regarding the decisions of their parliament in Strasbourg’ (Habermas 2012: 14). The talk about serious shortcomings in the institutional design of the European Union was discussed long before the financial crisis of 2008–2009 and before the migration crisis of 2015. But no profound changes or institutional reforms were carried out.

CONCLUSIONS
For a long time, the discourse of European identity was built around the idea of progressive integration, through which people should feel like members of a single consortium. The optimistic scenario of such a development assumed that the people of the EU would gradually begin to see the EU as a guarantor against returning to the past, to a reality from which many EU members, mainly Eastern Europeans, have left. Therefore, membership in the European Union will become a matter of course for any inhabitant of Europe.

The promise of EU enlargement once gave the countries of Eastern Europe hope for a change in their position as peripheral countries. EU membership can be deemed a ‘return to Europe’. Europe is understood in terms of values and, therefore, as a ‘Europe of equals’ (Michalski 2006). This is expressed in a discourse that emphasises the important emotional driving force behind the desire of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to integrate and strengthen their identity. As perceptions of a threat from the east weakened among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the first decade of the 20th century, some European writers were quick to point out a ‘new fear of domination, this time from the West’ (Hooghe, Marks 2009). However, the threat from the East became apparent in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and unleashed warfare under ‘false flag’ in the Donbass, and in 2022 confirmed its reputation as an aggressive, imperial and militaristic state, dreaming of territorial expansion and dominance in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is likely that the full-scale armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine will push European decision-makers to carry out institutional reforms. In fact, the European Union is on the threshold of a new stage in its institutional strengthening and strengthening of the solidarity of the European peoples. However, the expected strengthening of European identity will come about on the basis of protection against new threats, and not on the basis of the optimistic expectations of an era of prosperity. Thus, a new stage of European integration and the formation of European identity will begin under the influence of negative incentives, just like the emergence of the European Union itself.

References
Krizės ištiktos Europos politinės tapatybės filosofiniai ir socialiniai pagrindai naujame Europos integracijos etape

Santrauka

Raktažodžiai: kultūros filosofija, politikos filosofija, modernybės filosofija, tautų Europa, Europos tapatybė, Europos integracija, Europos politinės institucijos, tarpkultūriškumas