Demographic Continuity as a Necessary Condition of Performable Post-communist Token Social Restorations

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We test the hypothesis that demographic continuity was a necessary condition of performable token post-communist social restorations. Demographic continuity means sufficient overlapping between populations of original and restored systems. Token social restoration refers to restorations where original and restored systems are identical. It is opposed to type restoration where original and restored systems are numerically different instances of the same type. The identity of original and restored systems in token restorations is achieved by performing various practices in the restored system to establish institutional continuity with the original system. The restitution of property rights is the most important of them in the post-communist restorations. So our hypothesis claims that these practices cannot be performed without sufficient demographic continuity. We abstract the demographic continuity thresholds by measuring shares of survivors from the precommunist times in the population of Baltic countries by 1990. Our data confirm the hypothesis as in none of post-communist countries with demographic continuity below these thresholds there was property rights restitution.

Keywords: post-communist transformation, social restorations, property rights restitution, demographic continuity, Baltic countries, Robert A. Kann (1906–1981)
INTRODUCTION

This paper contributes to the research inspired by the theory of social restorations. This theory was advanced by Robert Kann (1968), who provided an authoritative definition of social restoration, grounded in the comparative analysis of 11 social restoration cases. According to Kann, restoration is the final component in a larger pattern of social change, featuring the sequence of original (A), intermediate (B) and restored (C) social systems, where the restored system affirms constructs, or claims continuity with the original (or ancient) system that was disrupted by the revolutionary transition from the original to an intermediate system.

The first wave of modern social restorations was post-Napoleonic restorations in 1814–1815, marking the failure of the French Revolution of 1789. An important difference between post-Napoleonic restorations and post-communist transformations is the long duration of the intermediate period. In Russia and most republics of the former Soviet Union, it was 74 years (1917–1991), in the Baltic countries 50 years (1940–1990), and in the formerly Communist Central and South Eastern European countries 41–45 (1944/48–1989) years. This means that some 2–3 generations were socialised under the intermediate system.

Can the concept of social restoration be applied to post-communist transformations despite so long duration of the intermediate system? This is the research question of our contribution. Kann (1906–1981) just did not live long enough to witness post-communist transformations and to answer this question himself. ‘We suggest that restoration has reasonable expectations of success only if it can be accomplished in the course of a political generation of some thirty-five to forty years’ (Kann 1968: 100). This implies either the forecast that post-communist restorations will fail, or that the concept of social restoration is not applicable to post-communist transformations.

We will argue that the application of the concept of restoration to post-communist transformations is correct and illuminating. However, Kann’s suggestion of the maximal duration of the intermediate period is misguiding. Instead, we should ask about the threshold values for overlapping between populations of original and restored systems. These threshold values can be found by researching the demographic continuity of the populations of Baltic countries from 1940–1990 which can be considered as paradigmatic (most instructive) cases of post-communist restorations.

We prove the applicability of the theory of social restorations to post-communist restorations by deed, distinguishing two varieties of social restoration (token and type) and testing a hypothesis about one of these varieties: demographic continuity between populations of original and restored social systems is a necessary condition of the performability of token social restorations. We will proceed in four steps, explaining the concepts used in this hypothesis in the process.

In the next section, we will provide a definition of the concept of demographic continuity to formulate the threshold problem in an exact way. Here we apply the method of conceptual analysis. Next, we provide data on the demographic continuity between pre-communist and post-communist populations in 1989–1991. The further section provides an interpretation of this data, highlighting the connection between the share of survivors from pre-communism and the presence or absence of property rights restitution under post-communism. In these two sections, we apply the descriptive statistical method to data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, which is the empirical basis of this study. The next section uses this data to gauge demographic continuity threshold values assuming the paradigmatic status of Baltic restorations and to test
the hypothesis. We apply here historical and comparative methods, using also data on the restitution of property rights in the formerly Communist countries from Bazyler et al. 2019; Stan, Nedelsky 2013. The conclusion provides a summary of the most important findings.

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CONTINUITY IN SOCIAL RESTORATIONS

The idea (and problem) of demographic continuity is visualised in the Figure containing the Venn diagrams representing the relation between the population of original system at the moment of its destruction, and the population of restored system C at the moment of its restoration. As time goes on, persons socialised under the original system (Ancien Régime) die out, becoming replaced by their offspring socialised under the post-revolutionary regime. As far as the family remains the sole institution of socialisation, the values of former generations are inculcated in the offspring generations. However, under modern conditions, family is increasingly sidelined by the school, the military (during military service) and various youth associations.

Generally, all these socialisation institutions are under state control and can be used by the post-revolutionary regime for indoctrination of the new generation, as indeed was the case after both great modern revolutions (Russian and French). It may also be argued that the exposition to socialisation agents inculcating new values is inversely related to the age at the time of the establishment of the post-revolutionary regime. School-age juveniles experiencing a radical change in the teaching content can be expected less susceptible to new values in comparison with younger peers who do not remember alternatives.

Importantly, when the intermediate system endures less than one generation (in Kann’s sense), survivors from the original system (represented by the intersection of populations of the original and restored systems) may still make up a considerable part of the population of the restored system. With life expectancy at birth in France by 1816 close to 40 years, its 14.6

Figure. Relation between the survivors from original system A and the population of restored system C in token and type restorations (see the text for explanation of these concepts). Authors’ own production
million male population in 1815 included 35.9% of survivors from pre-revolutionary times, who were at least 10 years old in 1790, and 29.7%, who were aged 15 or older in this year. In the 15.7 million female population in 1815 (France at its 1861 borders), the shares of survivors aged at least 15 and 10 from the times before 1790 were 30.4 and 37.0%, respectively. Counting all males born before 1790, their share in the total male population was 49.6%, while in the female population of France in 1815, the share of their peers was 51.7% (Vallin, Meslé 2001).

**THE DATA: DEMOGRAPHIC CONTINUITY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST RESTORATIONS**

The Table provides the summary of data on the share of survivors from the times before the Communist takeover at the time of the start of the post-communist transformation. Dating both the start and the end of the intermediate Communist period, we follow the established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Establishment of Communist regime</th>
<th>Post-communist restoration</th>
<th>Survivors from pre-communist times (% of the total population)</th>
<th>Survivors from pre-communist times who were at least 10 years old (% of the total population)</th>
<th>Survivors from pre-communist times who were at least 15 years old (% of the total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16.37%</td>
<td>8.69%</td>
<td>5.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1917–1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5.87%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>27.32%</td>
<td>16.51%</td>
<td>11.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>39.35</td>
<td>27.37%</td>
<td>21.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>36.47%</td>
<td>24.69%</td>
<td>17.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Czechia</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>40.23%</td>
<td>26.97%</td>
<td>22.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29.34%</td>
<td>17.05%</td>
<td>11.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6.07%</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
<td>29.29%</td>
<td>23.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29.91%</td>
<td>17.32%</td>
<td>11.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27.61%</td>
<td>15.92%</td>
<td>10.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23.27%</td>
<td>13.11%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.66%</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>27.41%</td>
<td>16.89%</td>
<td>11.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>33.24%</td>
<td>22.02%</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>26.73%</td>
<td>15.85%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conventions (see, e.g. Berglund et al. 2013 (1998); Frucht 2005). For Russia properly, we date the beginning of this period with 1917, although in fact due to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1918 most of its territory was not under Bolshevik control until 1920. The extension of the sphere of this control involved the destruction of several independent states which were established in 1918 in the peripheries of former republics (Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) and restored in 1990–1991.

The cruel custom of tribal societies to kill all boys and males of the vanquished groups older than 10–15 years of age, as reported by anthropologists and human ethologists (Edgerton 1992: 66; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979; Simons 1999), may provide a seemingly macabre but nevertheless very firm support for the choice of 10 or 15 years of age as threshold age values to distinguish the surviving members of the original society from the ‘children of the revolution’. The share of survivors who were at least 15 years old at the termination of the original state is most important for ensuring ‘living continuity’ between the original and restored systems, as it includes persons who completed the basics of their secondary socialisation (meaning socialisation outside the family) under the ‘ancient regime’ and are thus the least susceptible to being implanted with new values, attitudes and loyalties (Gaitán 2009). At the same time, they are dangerous to the new regime as bearers and transmitters of cultural legacies perceived as impediments for its complete triumph.

THE FINDINGS: TWO VARIETIES OF POST-COMMUNIST RESTORATIONS

Comparing the shares of survivors from pre-communist times in the population of the Communist countries we can distinguish two groups of countries. In the first group, the share of total survivors is above 25%, that of survivors with the primary socialisation completed under

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<th>No.</th>
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<th>Survivors from pre-communist times who were at least 10 years old (% of the total population)</th>
<th>Survivors from pre-communist times who were at least 15 years old (% of the total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>36.62%</td>
<td>25.35%</td>
<td>19.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.57%</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>36.22%</td>
<td>22.71%</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>33.99%</td>
<td>23.15%</td>
<td>18.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>33.41%</td>
<td>21.38%</td>
<td>15.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1917–1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7.02%</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1917–1920</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the pre-communist system above 15%, and the share of those who were at least 15 years old at the
time of the Communist takeover is above 10%. These are countries where the Communist
takeover took place after 1939. The only exception is Albania, perhaps because its population
was younger due to a higher natural increase. In the remaining countries, the shares of survi-
vors are very low, while the Communist takeover took place in 1917–1920.

The purpose of the revolutions of the Russian type (self-described as ‘socialist rev-
olutions’) was the abolition of private property over means of production, considered in
the Communist ideology as the root of all social evils. So post-communist transformation
can be described as ‘restoration’ (of capitalism), as far as it involved massive privatisation of
state-owned assets. However, only in part of the former Communist countries privatisation
included the restitution of the property rights to former owners or their heirs. As far as most
assets that were privatised were created during ‘socialist industrialisation’, the most important
asset for the restitution was land.

We claim that the absence of sufficient demographic continuity accounts for the absence
of property restitution which is a key practice to performing restoration by establishing the in-
stitutional continuity between pre-communist and post-communist social systems. Larger
shares of survivors mean a larger number of stakeholders in the restitution of nationalised
property or those who perceive it as just. They make the restitution of ancient property rights
practicable, decreasing transaction costs in identifying legitimate claimants and solving their
conflicts, which are unavoidable between successors.

The increase in the number of successors with the generation change also increases
the conflict potential during attempted restitution. Therefore, in all countries with the aboli-
tion of private property rights (collectivisation and nationalisation) taking place before 1939,
the restoration of the private property-based market economy (capitalism) did include only
privatisation (without restitution). This applies even to Georgia (Sakartvelo) which claims
the continuity of the contemporary Georgian state and the short-lived Democratic Republic
of Georgia (Jones 2014).

Generally, without the sufficient demographic continuity between original and restored
systems, their claimed or asserted identity can be only fictional. This applies to restorations of
states, political regimes and socio-economic systems. To differentiate between real and only
fictional restorations we would like to suggest distinguishing two varieties of restoration: to-
ken and type. In token restorations, there is an overlap (or demographic continuity) between
the populations from the original and the restored systems. In type restorations, there is no
overlap or it is below the continuity thresholds.

Importantly, the opposition of token and type refers not to the colloquial sense of token,
connoting ‘superficial’ or even ‘fake’. Rather, it is used in the ontological and logical sense,
where type refers to the general sort of thing and token to its particular concrete instances
(according to Peirce (1933, 4: 537). Sequence A A A is that of three tokens of the same type
(capital letter A). Token restoration involves continuity between the earlier (past) and later
stages of a given object and is concerned with its individuality and uniqueness. Type res-
\text{toration} means the production of a copy of the perished original. In this case, original and
restored systems are not numerically identical or discontinuous. To provide an elementary
example, if we write A on the board, erase it and write it again, we do a type restoration of A.
If instead of completely erasing A, we just damage it by erasing its ‘legs’ below the plank inside
(and so transforming it into Δ), and then reattaching its two missing parts (to get A again), we
do a token restoration of A (see Wetzel 2008).
HOW MUCH DEMOGRAPHIC CONTINUITY IS ENOUGH? USING PARADIGMATIC CASES OF POST-COMMUNIST RESTORATION TO FIND CONTINUITY THRESHOLDS

The cross-country comparison of the survivor shares in the population from the pre-communist past by 1989–1991 and the economic and political performance of countries under post-communism listed in the Table suggests the further hypothesis that larger shares were an important asset rather than a liability for the success of the post-communist transformation (Norkus 2022). With few exceptions, countries where a socialist system was installed before 1939, did display lower growth rates and did fail to democratise (cp. Norkus 2012). However, because of space limitations, we postpone the examination of this issue for the next occasion, because we still owe the answer to the question: Which survivor shares are sufficient for the very possibility of real (or token) restoration?

We will argue that the Baltic countries as paradigmatic cases of post-communist restorations may help to find the answer. Restoration is the master narrative in the social imaginary of all three Baltic countries. As the story goes, Baltic peoples are living in the restored states and market economies, after they were destroyed for 50 years by the Soviet invasion in 1940. This story applies also to democracy, which was restored even after a long break, starting with the authoritarian coups in 1926 (Lithuania) and 1934 (Estonia and Latvia). Therefore, we will argue that a comparative analysis of the demographic continuity between the populations of interwar and restored Baltic states helps to answer an important question in the sociology of social restorations in the making.

The contemporary Baltic States are paradigmatic cases of post-communist restorations because their constitutional doctrines assert their identity to their interwar-era namesakes. They define the de facto extinctions of the Baltic States in 1940–1990 as mere occupations, differing from that of Norway or the Netherlands by Nazi Germany in 1940–1945 only in terms of duration. In all former Communist countries there was the privatisation of the means of production and so the restoration of capitalism. In some of them, democracy was also restored. But only in the Baltic countries there was ternary restoration, involving (in addition to restoration of capitalism and democracy) also the token restoration of nation-state after the loss of independence during World War II. Therefore, the threshold values of demographic continuity can be gauged or read off from the shares of survivors from the interwar independence period in the Baltic countries as of 1990.

Of special importance and interest are survivor shares in the population of the late Soviet Latvia, because this country did establish its continuity with the interwar Latvian state and democracy in the most self-determined and straightforward way. This was implemented through the reenactment of the Constitution (Satversme) that had been accepted by its Constituent Assembly in 1922, and of the 1937 Civil Code. Estonia started independence restoration in 1990 with the reenactment of selected articles from its 1937 Constitution, and Lithuania reenacted its Constitution of 1938. However, these constitutions were designed to legalise authoritarian regimes, and so were replaced by new constitutions with affirmations of the continuity of the respective states in their texts.

In 1990, the Latvian population had only 7.29% of people at least 15 years old in 1934 (born in 1919 or earlier), 10.77% who were at least 10 years old (born in 1924 or earlier), and 22.23% born in 1934 and earlier (according to the Human Mortality Database (2023)). These

* According to the influential definition, master narratives are ‘culturally shared stories that guide thoughts, beliefs, values, and behaviors’ (McLean, Syed 2015: 323).
figures are not large, but based on them we would like to nevertheless claim that at least 7% of survivors from the original system who were aged 15 years or older at the time of its revolutionary breakdown, at least 10% of survivors who were at least 10 years old and at least 20% of survivors born before the breakdown are the threshold values separating the social systems where the token restoration of the original system is socio-demographically possible from those where only type restoration can be attempted.

Downward rounding of these figures also allows one to qualify Estonia as another case of the token restoration of interwar democracy, because its survivor shares from 1934 (the year of authoritarian coup) are a bit lower: 21.79% of total survivors, 10.64% survivors who were at least 10 years old in 1934 and 7.03% of those who were at least 15 years old. However, in Lithuania democracy was only type restored, because by 1990 the share of survivors born in 1926 or earlier was only 11.07% of the total population.

Comparing the data on the shares of survivors from the pre-communist period (in the Table) and those on the restitution of property rights (Bazyler et al. 2019; Stan, Nedelsky 2013) we find that property rights were not restituted in the countries where Communist takeover did take place before 1939. There was privatisation without restitution. Importantly, in all these countries the demographic continuity values are considerably below the threshold values specified above. Our hypothesis claims that demographic continuity is only necessary, but not a sufficient condition for restitution and other policies, performing the institutional continuity between original and restored systems.

Therefore, it is not falsified by few cases with demographic continuity but no restitution (Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Moldova). Most importantly, there is no country in the second group with demographic continuity below our thresholds. The only exception is Albania, where the share of survivors who were at least 15 years old was 5.83% and that of survivors who were at least 10 years old was 8.69%. However, there was no property restitution in this country. This means that data confirm our hypothesis: the demographic continuity between populations of original and restored social systems is a necessary condition of the performability of token social restorations.

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we did remove the obstacles to applying the theory of social restorations, designed by R. A. Kann, to post-communist restoration. This obstacle was the inclusion of the maximal duration of an intermediate system for more than one 'political generation' (35–40 years) into the definition of restoration, defining in this way restorations with longer intermediate systems out of existence (and as far as Communist systems did exist longer, post-communist transformations cannot be classified as restorations).

According to our argument, the duration of the intermediate system matters only for the performability of the token restorations, manifested by the construction of the institutional continuity between restored and original systems (by re-enacting prerevolutionary legislation, restoring ownership rights, implementing retroactive justice to revolutionaries and their victims, etc.). Type restorations involve only the generic similarity (but no identity) between the original and restored systems and so can take place without the survivals from the original system which disappear with passing of time (the restoration of the Jewish state in 1948 may serve as another example of type restoration).

Most important survivals from the original system are human survivors, socialised under prerevolutionary conditions. There were very few such survivors in the countries where
Communist regimes were established in 1917–1920. Importantly, no attempts to construct institutional continuity were made in these countries. This validates our hypothesis that demographic continuity is a necessary condition of performable social restoration. As far as the restored Baltic States (especially Latvia) did construct the institutional continuity with their interwar time predecessors in the most encompassing (restoring state, democracy and ownership rights) and successful way, the shares of survivors from the interwar time in their populations as of 1990 can be considered as demographic continuity threshold values for all modern token restorations.

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